Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
KH is a Shiite Islamist organization that professes Wilayat al-Faqih, or the Guardianship of the Jurist. Formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shiite cleric and Iran’s first Supreme Leader, Wilayat al-Faqih is a Shiite Islamist theory of governance that seeks to entrust temporal political authority over God’s people entirely to an Islamic jurist (Faqih).[155] As with other so-called muqawama groups (“resistance” groups; a term used to distinguish Iran-aligned militants in Iraq), KH recognizes Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, as the group’s marja’ al-Taqlid – a preeminent Shiite spiritual leader that wields considerable authority over his adherents.[156] As such, the group and its muqawama counterparts do not recognize Ayatollah Sistani, another prominent Shiite cleric based in Najaf, Iraq, or any other clerics as their source of spiritual authority and emulation. In line with its allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader and the principles of the Iranian Revolution, KH seeks to institute a Shia Islamic government in Iraq analogous to Iran’s own theocratic government.[157] Given the group’s recognition of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei as its marja’ al-Taqlid, it can be said that the theocratic government KH and its counterparts envision for Iraq would be subservient to but formally independent from Iran.
In 2005, KH founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was elected as a member of parliament (MP) in the Iraqi Parliament under his real name, Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi. However, in 2007, Muhandis abandoned his political position and fled to Iran after information surfaced regarding his role in planning the 1983 attacks on the American and French Embassies in Kuwait.[158]
Despite this brief incursion of the group’s founder into Iraqi politics, KH itself has not undertaken any form of formal participation in the Iraqi political system.[159] However, the group released statements challenging certain policies of Prime Minister Abadi. In September 2015, KH and other Shia militias derailed the Iraqi government’s proposed National Guard law, which would have placed PMF militias like KH under more direct government control.[160] KH and other Shia groups have also sought to pressure the government into scuttling proposed reforms by ramping up levels of violence on the streets of Baghdad or by threatening to remove their fighters from the front lines against IS.[161] In 2019 and 2020, KH escalated domestic political protests and incited violence to pressure the Iraqi government to adopt a more anti-American stance.[162]
U.S. forces in Iraq have been a primary target of KH since the group’s founding. Although the group claims to avoid targeting Iraqi civilians, reports indicate that KH has targeted anyone working with the U.S.-backed Iraqi government, as well as Sunni civilians.[163] After the U.S. withdrew from Iraq in 2011, KH’s main target shifted from U.S. forces to the Islamic State (IS). U.S. forces returned to Iraq in 2014 to assist with the counter-IS campaign, and KH reportedly cooperated with U.S. troops on some occasions, such as the siege of Amerli.[164] However, KH’s rhetoric has remained virulently anti-American.
In late 2018 and early 2019, KH refocused its efforts to undermine U.S. influence in Iraq. The group has targeted U.S. military and diplomatic personnel. It carried out attacks near the U.S. Consulate in Basra in September 2018 and led a march against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in December 2019. [165] KH also killed a U.S. contractor and wounded multiple U.S. and Iraqi troops in an attack on the Iraqi K-1 Air Base near Kirkuk in late December 2019.[166] The U.S. held KH responsible for another attack in March 2020 against a coalition military installation near Baghdad that killed a U.S. soldier, a British soldier, and a U.S. contractor. [167] KH has also reportedly begun to employ long-range suicide drones to attack targets both within and outside of Iraq. Most notably, the group is believed to have used drones in attacks against U.S. and coalition military installations across Iraq and a suspected KH-sponsored attack against the Saudi royal palace in Riyadh in January 2021.[168]
KH has also cooperated with the Iraqi government and other Shia militia forces against IS and its allies in Iraq. The group participated in multiple operations to retake IS-held territory in Iraq. In many of these operations, KH reportedly used indiscriminate force in the fight against IS and even intentionally targeted Sunni civilians.[169] Reports have also indicated that KH was involved in violent attacks on civilian anti-government protestors in 2019.[170]
Beginning as early as 2011, KH was active in Syria, fighting alongside the Assad regime against Syrian opposition groups.[171] In addition, KH enlisted the help of Hezbollah to train its members in the urban street fighting tactics often used in Syria.[172] Most of KH’s most recent activity has been recorded in Iraq, although it maintains bases and weapons caches in Syria as of December 2019.[173]
Throughout the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003-2011), KH was known for its use of roadside bombs and rockets – especially Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions (IRAMs) – in its attacks against coalition forces.[174] In December 2009, KH conducted a sophisticated cyber-attack, hacking into U.S. Predator drone feeds in Iraq in order to monitor and evade U.S. military operations. This led many to speculate that the organization has a relatively sophisticated cyber unit or specialist working under its command.[175]
The group has also utilized Iran-backed television channels to solicit donations and increase its recruitment in Iraq.[176] In 2019 and 2020, KH has relied heavily on sophisticated weapons provided by Iran, including drones, Katyusha rocket launchers, and shoulder-fired missiles.[177] In 2011, Iraqi intelligence officials indicated that KH fighters were paid between $300-$500 per month and that fighters were broken into highly segregated cells within a rigid organizational structure.[178] However, it is unclear if these reports were accurate or continue to hold true today.
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
February 19, 2008: KH launched an improvised rocket-assisted munition (IRAM) explosive device at a U.S. military base southeast of Baghdad, killing one U.S. civilian (1 killed, unknown wounded).[179]
June 4, 2008: KH conducted an attack meant to target coalition forces but instead killed 18 civilians and destroyed 19 homes. This attack was described in a press release by the U.S. Department of Defense, and its location was not given (18 killed, 29 wounded).[180]
November 29, 2008: A KH rocket attack killed 2 U.N. contractors in a rocket attack against a U.N. compound in Baghdad’s Green Zone (2 killed, 15 wounded).[181]
June 2014: In summer 2014, KH fought alongside the Iraqi security forces in counter-IS operations in the Anbar province, particularly around the city of Fallujah (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[182]
August 2014: KH, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and other militias affiliated with PMF participated in the Battle of Amerli against Islamic State forces. KH and its allies were assisted by U.S. airstrikes and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[183]
September 2-3, 2015: 18 Turkish workers were kidnapped in Baghdad by unknown assailants. It is speculated that the kidnappers may have been associated with KH and have received direction from Iran, competing with Turkey for influence in Syria.[184] The kidnappers identified themselves as the “Death Squads” and demanded that Turkey end its siege of several Syrian Shia towns. [185] Iraqi forces entered an area near a KH office in Baghdad while searching for the Turkish workers. KH gunmen opened fire, killing one and injuring three of the Iraqi troops.[186] All 18 Turkish workers were eventually released.[187] KH’s involvement in the kidnapping was never confirmed (1 killed, 3 wounded).
May 2016: KH and other Shia militias affiliated with PMF participated in the Iraqi army’s capture of Fallujah from the Islamic State. KH was among the Shia militias accused of beating and executing dozens of Sunni civilians in the re-captured city (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[188]
February 2017: KH and other Shia militias affiliated with PMF participated in the Iraqi army’s capture of Mosul from IS (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[189]
December 2017: KH and other Shia militias affiliated with PMF joined Syrian forces and seized the town of Abu Kamal on the Syria-Iraq border (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[190]
September 2018: KH allegedly conducted a rocket attack near the U.S. Consulate in Basra, prompting its evacuation and closure (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[191]
May 2019: KH carried out a drone attack that destroyed oil pumps in Saudi Arabia (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[192]
December 2019: KH conducted a rocket attack against K-1 Air Base in Kirkuk, Iraq, killing a U.S. contractor. The attack was believed to have been a part of IRGC Major General Qassim Suleimani and KH leader Muhandis’s plan to provoke a U.S. military response in order to redirect Iraqi anger towards the U.S. and away from Iran (1 killed, 6 wounded).[193]
December 2019: KH fighters led a mass protest that escalated into an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in response to retaliatory U.S. airstrikes against KH bases. Protesters breached and burned perimeter buildings (0 killed, unknown wounded).[194]
March 2020: KH reportedly conducted a rocket attack against Camp Taji, a U.S. coalition military installation near Baghdad. Usbat al-Thaireen, allegedly a front for KH, claimed responsibility. The attack was believed to have been in retaliation for the U.S. assassination of KH leader Muhandis in January 2020 (3 killed, 12 wounded).[195]
February 15, 2021: KH is believed to have been involved in a rocket attack on a coalition-run military base at Erbil International Airport, killing a civilian contractor with the coalition and wounding six others.[196] A U.S. Defense Department-led investigation into the attack later determined that KH and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, another Iran-aligned Iraqi militia, bore responsibility.[197]
There is not much information on KH’s relationship with the Shia communities in Iraq. However, the group has been accused on several occasions – both during the U.S. war in Iraq and during the fight against IS – of instigating sectarian violence and sectarian cleansing. For example, in 2016, KH allegedly executed hundreds of Sunni civilians after helping to retake Fallujah and Mosul from IS. The organization was accused of similar atrocities in 2014 and 2015 in Samarra and Tikrit.[202] In 2019, KH was accused of firing on civilian anti-government protesters demonstrating against Iranian interference in Iraq.[203]
Since its formation in 2007, KH has maintained close relations with the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These ties were most likely facilitated by KH founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who fought with the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war and reportedly held Iranian citizenship.[204] Many sources speculate that the IRGC had a direct role in KH’s founding. Both the IRGC and Hezbollah established camps in Iraq in order to train and equip KH fighters. These actors have also facilitated the transportation of KH members to Iran and Lebanon to undergo further training.[205] In the case of Hezbollah, KH has maintained particularly close ties with Unit 3800, the Hezbollah sub-group dedicated to training Iraqi Shia militias.
In Syria, KH has fought alongside the IRGC, Hezbollah, and many other Iraqi Shia militias. These Shia groups include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), the Badr Organization, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS).[206] KH’s relationship with the Badr Organization stems from KH founder Muhandis’s affiliation with the group that predates the establishment of KH. In 1985, Muhandis purportedly joined the Badr Organization’s predecessor group, the Badr Brigades (also known as the Badr Corps). He served as the group’s commander for a time in the late 1980s and early 1990s. While commander of the Badr Brigades, Muhandis’ chief of staff was Haider al-Ameri, the current head of the Badr Organization. After leaving the Badr Brigades, Muhandis reportedly retained close ties with Ameri.
Muhandis is also believed to have maintained connections to his successor at the Badr Brigades, Mustapha al-Sheibani.[207] After commanding the Badr Brigades through the 1990s, Sheibani went on to run the infamous Sheibani Network, a smuggling network that transported IRGC funding and munitions from Iran to Iraqi Shia militias (such as AAH and KH) during the Iraq War.[208] Following the war’s conclusion, Sheibani went on to command Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), an Iraqi Shia militia founded in 2013 by KH and the Badr Organization. KH and KSS retain close ties and reportedly fought together in both Iraq and Syria.[209]
KH is also believed to have ties to Kata’ib Imam Ali (KIA), a Shia Iraqi militant group founded in July 2014. Although there is little direct evidence of coordination between the two organizations, Muhandis was believed to be a senior figure in KIA. In addition, Muhandis simultaneously served as the head of KH, leading many experts to speculate about the relationship between the two groups.[210]
KH and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) also have a long history of coordination. The groups purportedly cooperated against coalition forces in Iraq during the Iraq War and occasionally staged joint attacks. Since the end of the Iraq War, the two groups have fought together in Iraq against the Islamic State (IS) and in Syria alongside pro-Assad forces.[211] In June 2013, AAH and KH purportedly co-founded Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), an Iraqi Shia militia that remains active in Syria. Both KH and AAH are believed to have maintained close ties with HHN.[212]
In addition to its role in the formation of KSS and HHN, KH also established several other small Shia militias. In 2012, KH, AAH, the Badr Organization, and other existing Iraqi Shia militias helped establish KH front group Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) to assist the Assad regime in Syria.[213] Beginning in 2013, KH, AAH, and the Badr Organization sent fighters under their own banners to fight in Syria, and LAFA became effectively independent.[214] In April 2014, KH also formed Saraya al-Difa al-Shabi (KH-SDS), a KH subgroup and PMF militia explicitly dedicated to fighting IS in Iraq.[215]
Observers believe that KH has established and used so-called “shadow groups” to further its militant activities. These groups – many of which were formed shortly after the deaths of Qassim Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January 2020 – reportedly claim public responsibility for attacks in the more established militias’ stead to create plausible deniability.[216] Other major militant groups in Iraq, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization, likely use these shadow groups for the same purpose. For example, observers believe KH used this tactic when a new militia group calling itself Usbat al-Thaireen (“The League of Revolutionaries”) announced its existence by claiming responsibility for three separate rocket attacks on U.S.-led coalition forces at Camp Taji and Besmaya Base in March 2020.[217] Another notable attack likely perpetrated by KH-affiliated “shadow groups” occurred in January 2021, when a group named Alwiya Waad al-Haq (“The Righteous Promise Brigades”) claimed responsibility for a drone attack on the Saudi royal palace in Riyadh.[218] In addition, another group believed to be linked to KH named, Qasem al-Jabbarin (“The Smasher of the Oppressors”), has mounted a campaign of roadside bombings against Iraqi-operated convoys supplying the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.[219] Observers believe Usbat al-Thaireen, Alwiya Waad al-Haq, and Qasem al-Jabbarin are linked to KH on two main grounds: 1) observed rhetorical alignment between confirmed KH statements and the groups’ attacks’ targets; and 2) the extensive and near-instant coverage KH-affiliated media gave to the groups’ attacks.[220]
Moreover, some analysts have speculated that KH formed and backs several smaller, generally unarmed militant groups (firaq) to conduct lower-level operations in and around Baghdad. Analysts argue that KH uses the firaq, some of which are named Rab’ Allah, Ahbab Allah, Al-Zelm al-Khashnah, and Abu Jeddaha, to project power and attack KH opponents in Baghdad – all while maintaining a degree of deniability.[221] In doing so, the firaq have gained a reputation for thuggery and intimidation among Baghdadis, having carried out a series of bombings against liquor stores, attacking workers at a spa, attacking media outlets that are critical of the PMF, and intimidating local activists and protest leaders.[222] The firaq have also carried out higher-profile attacks against KH’s political opponents. For example, in October, Rab’ Allah attacked and burned the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) after a member of the KDP criticized KH and other PMF groups.[223] KH has usually distanced itself from the groups’ activities. However, when Rab’ Allah drew criticism for its participation in a military parade alongside regular members of KH in March 2021, official spokesmen for KH defended the group’s actions as a routine transfer of PMF fighters that “did not require coordination with any other entities,” suggesting closer ties between KH and the firaq than many observers had expected.[224]
KH is also a dominant member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of Iraqi Shia militias formed in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. PMF is nominally under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, but its largest and most powerful faction answers to the Iranian IRGC. Muhandis was a key founder of PMF and served as its leader until his death in January 2020.[225] Other major organizations in PMF include AAH, the Badr Organization, KSS, KIA, HHN, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Peace Brigades (formerly known as the Mahdi Army).[226]
Between 2014 and 2017, KH cooperated with Iraqi forces and Shia militias in Iraq to target the Islamic State. In 2017, IS declined in strength and lost control of large amounts of territory in Iraq and Syria. [227] As the threat of IS diminished, KH refocused its efforts on attacking the U.S. coalition in Iraq. KH also considers some other Iraqi militant groups to be its enemies, including the Sufi-Ba’athist Jaysh al-Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) and the Sunni 1920s Revolution Brigades (1920s RB).[228]
KH maintains a close relationship with Iran and identifies Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, as its spiritual leader. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directs much of KH’s activity and provides a significant amount of the group’s funds and training.[229] As a leading member of PMF, KH nominally lies under the authority of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense. However, despite efforts by Iraq’s executive to integrate PMF units into the regular armed forces’ command structure, many members of the PMF, including KH, effectively operate autonomously and, in many cases, answer to Iran.[230] KH also maintains close relations with the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, another Iranian proxy organization, which has provided both training and funding to KH.[231]
In Syria, KH has fought alongside the army of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war.[232] However, some reports have claimed that KH’s relationship with Assad predated the conflict. Additionally, the Syrian government allegedly allowed KH fighters to use Syria as a smuggling route to and from Iraq during the Iraq War.[233] As of December 2019, KH maintains bases and munitions storage in Syria, but the extent of its ongoing involvement in Syria is unknown.[234]
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