Obviously the 2018 I wrote is a fair bit different than yours, (though yours is well thought out and I wouldn't be surprised it happens) but there is something I disagree with.


Given your 2018, it would be way too easy for Washington Dems to spin 2018 as, if not a positive, a dodged bullet. This is a Senate environment where the GOP could have easily gained a filibuster-proof majority, and yet they only picked up 4 seats in low hanging fruit. I'd be disappointed in the results, sure, but I'd be really happy to see Brown, Baldwin, Nelson, Klobuchar, Casey, and especially Tester survive. (though the House results would admittedly be upsetting)

Though that also brings me to a question about elections. Do we see a comeback for ticket splitting? In 2016 every state voted for the same party at the Senate level as the Presidential. However, in your 2020, Maine sends Pence its electoral votes and a Democrat to the Senate, and in 2024, Indiana and ND does the same thing. What happens going forward? Do Senators like Boozman, Kennedy, and Paul survive 2028? When the GOP's northern strategy bears fruit, would Northern wine-track Democrats continue to vote for Democratic Senators and Governors while voting GOP at the national level? Or does ticket-splitting as a whole stay rare?

You must be a timetraveler or some kind of 4 dimensional being

So the DCCC reached its nadir, the DSCC had an okay night/dodged a bullet and the DGA had a fantastic one. But I see your point, high expectations and low returns would yield a disappointment.


I considered this and the answer is yes. As we de-polarize in the age of Cordray, Republicans and Democrats alike start breaking from their national parties and Republicans strategically appeal to Northern voters to win elections. So, by 2030, you're going to see a bunch of Northern Republicans winning seats and political positions in unusual areas.

The fate of Senators like Boozman, Kennedy, and Paul probably hinges on how well they adapt to the new political climate. People like Boozman and Kennedy, who are natural populists, shift to find ground with the ruling Democratic class. People like Paul, who have been longtime ideologues, find themselves defeated down the line.
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Okay, that's honesty a huge relief. I'll probably stay a reliably Democratic voter for much of the Cordray era (unless the Republicans end up being more pro-immigration than the Dems, which might actually happen, and even then, eh) but I think ticket splitting is necessary to make American government function properly. Depolarisation is going to make for a welcome relief.


Squandering 2018 to eliminate the most ethically compromised President since Nixon and restore some semblance of decency to the White House? That sounds worth it to me, especially if you're right about medicare/social security/Obamacare going untouched

I'll admit, I find the Democratic gains in the House back in 2018 to be really paltry. Personally I see them flipping at least 9 or 10 districts in a bad year, and more if they do well. I reckon Trump holds his base but white suburbanites don't turnout because they're largely disillusioned with Trump. This makes more districts go Democratic, especially in places like California. Issa will probably lose, for example, and Denham/Waters look a bit precarious too.

Supplemental: Why RyanCare Failed

To understand why Paul Ryan’s RyanCare failed in 2017, you have to go back to the 1950s and understand the longstanding Republican compact with the electorate that guaranteed support in return for never enacting a key element of GOP orthodoxy: cutting the safety net.

Eisenhower to Goldwater

Start in 1952. Dwight Eisenhower won the Presidency by winning 45% of the manual collar class (as they were defined in 1952) and 50% in 1956. One reason Eisenhower won the Presidency was because unlike past nominees, Eisenhower was regarded as a moderate who would uphold the New Deal. Indeed, Eisenhower expanded the New Deal. His victory over Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio) signaled the triumph of the eastern establishment moderate Republicans - the people later reviled by the Reaganites.

In 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) lost the same group 71-29%. In fact, Goldwater won 46% of professional and business class workers, and 43% of white collar workers. So you can see the key differential for the Republicans, in one aspect, was their strength among the “manual class.” Reagan himself supported Goldwater’s position - a statement that later came back to haunt him in 1976.

One reason that Goldwater lost was because he campaigned on making Social Security optional and lambasted the notion of Medicare. After that election, the Republicans dropped the idea of challenging either Social Security or Medicare seriously. During the Nixon Presidency, President Richard Nixon largely adopted the Democratic line on entitlement programs (even going so far to contemplate a deal with Senator Ted Kennedy on healthcare reform in 1971).  

The Florida Republican Primary of 1976

The election of 1976 saw a watershed moment for the conservative movement. The Republican primary in Florida would set, inadvertently, the movement’s path forward on entitlements. Governor Reagan and President Ford fought for Florida’s Republican delegates on the issue of Social Security. Namely, a gaffe by the California governor, where he had said, “One of the failures of Social Security as a pension program is that the funds do not grow. They are not invested as they could be in the industrial might of America.” President Ford hit back, saying “Let's take the issue of Social Security. He has suggested from time to time that it ought to be voluntary, not mandatory as it is under the existing law. He has suggested that maybe the funds from the Social Security program ought to be invested in the stock market. I disagree with both of those proposals. I believe in the firm integrity of the Social Security program.” In the end, Ford won Florida by 53-47% - one of the two Southern primaries Reagan lost (and in Tennessee, it was 49-49%). The effort would leave a lasting mark on Ronald Reagan.

Meanwhile, in the same state, Governor George C. Wallace, in the Democratic Primary, also came out against Social Security cuts, arguing, “I would much rather see general revenues going as stop‐gap dollars to Social Security than to many of the crackpot schemes for which funds are now being budgeted.” Governor Wallace would be a conservative forerunner of Pat Buchanan and Donald Trump, suggesting that many of the Reagan-Buchanan-Trump voters were not amenable to Social Security cuts. In 1980, Reagan quietly shelved his idea of making Social Security voluntary and pledged to not change the program.

The Reagan Years

It was for this reason that in 1981, James Baker III, Ronald Reagan’s Chief of Staff, urged the President to not tackle Social Security. A Reagan plan to “reduce Social Security benefits for people who had retired before they turned 65”  failed 96-2 in the Senate and failed the House as well. Of course, the Reagan Administration was able to make substantive changes to Social Security disability benefits, but by and large, the program survived. In 1983, a deal to raise the payroll tax and the retirement age was cemented by a bipartisan commission headed by future Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and the Reagan Administration’s involvement in Social Security functionally stopped at that compromise.

The Gingrich Congress and Bush 43

During the 1990s, Republicans talked about privatizing Social Security, a longstanding idea that dated to Goldwater.  In fact, they shut down the government in 1995-1996 over their bid to change Medicare - and paid a political price for it. However, their opportunity did not come until the election of Governor George W. Bush (R-Texas.) The Texas Governor had campaigned on privatization and won a razor thin 2000 election. After his 2004 re-election, President Bush tried to push privatization but was rebuffed by Republicans in Congress after the Democrats put up a furious fight.

RyanCare in the 2010s

In 2011, Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin) pushed a plan to create Medicare vouchers to limit the growth of the program. Democrats howled that he was “pushing Grandma off a cliff,” and the plan was headed nowhere. When he was added to the Republican ticket in 2012, President Obama lambasted the Republican campaign on the basis of RyanCare. The 4 point loss suggested that there wasn’t enough of a market to promote major changes to the program.

Donald Trump's Populism

In 2016, Donald Trump campaigned on not touching either Social Security or Medicare. As far as Social Security went he said on March 10, 2016, “And it’s my absolute intention to leave Social Security the way it is. Not increase the age and to leave it as is.” On Medicare he said, “Every Republican wants to do a big number on Social Security. They want to do it on Medicare. They want to do it on Medicaid. And we can't do that.” His election to the Presidency seemed to foreclose that there was political support for RyanCare.

Putting it all together

Putting together the history, it suggests that Republicans have continually been unable to create a political coalition in favor of entitlement reforms instituted during the New Deal and Great Society. The only major welfare program reform they were able to reform was TANF - and that was with Democratic support. Given Mr. Trump’s refusal to campaign on entitlement reforms and given that the House GOP won the popular vote by only 1%, it suggests there is no mandate to pass a sweeping program like RyanCare that would limit Medicare substantially. The voters have long held a silent bargain with the Republicans that they could cut taxes, they could cut the EPA, they could cut minor programs but they could not touch Social Security or Medicare. Each time the program was even talked about in terms of reforms, voters have revolted.

There is another hidden reason that the programs are unlikely to be touched.  With the economic recovery weak and a considerable number of working families reliant on government benefits (e.g, Social Security disability benefits), and the fact that the Baby Boomers are retiring, it is unlikely there is mass support for reforms to these programs. And politically, the groups that are collecting these benefits are among the most Republican. Seniors were among the most Republican and so were the 45-64 crowd. Mr Trump won 40-49 49-46%, 50-64 52-44% and 65+ 52-45%.  

Without a sustained campaign to gain a mandate to reform the program, there is unlikely to be any support to pass it. If you want to do major changes to a political program with the extensive history that Social Security and Medicare have, you need a significant mandate to change it. Since the political mandate is neither there and the most affected groups would be Republican-leaning, there is little incentive for House and Senate Republicans to go along with the changes without Democratic support (which will not be forthcoming, as they are in opposition). This might not have been the case if Hillary Clinton had been President, but with an all-Republican government, it is unlikely the Democrats will cooperate at all.

Lastly, as part of the Reaganite majority coalition, it appears that the electorate (specifically blue collar conservatives) has agreed to support the GOP in return for no major entitlement changes. It just seems, at this point, a iron law of the Reagan era.

For these reasons, this is why I had RyanCare failing.

Above post is canonical.

 And we can have SD Dem if you want. I have no problem if people want to write more stories or continue this timeline or post more maps.

Correction to 2030: the Republican Party won New York in a sign of their 2036 victory which saw a 51-48% victory there and a 55-43% win in PA,  54-45% win in Connecticut. So 57-43.

Also, looking back at 2024's Senate results (Class 1 -- see pages 9-11 of the TL), the only reference to Montana's Senate election was in passing stating that it looked like the only possible GOP pickup.

Considering that the Democrats ended 2024 w/ 61 Senate seats but 8 pickups after having ended 2022 w/ 54 Senate seats, I (w/out any definitive result to the contrary) just assumed that Montana had gone GOP in 2024 Senate-wise, thereby precipitating 8 Democratic pickups but only a net gain of 7.

However, the above map of 2030's Class 1 shows Montana w/ a Democratic incumbent... so is the map wrong & MT really elected a GOP Senator in 2024 (thereby letting the math remain correct) or are the 2024 results as a whole wrong & the Democrats actually ended 2024 w/ 62 Senate seats (which would precipitate an edit to anything referencing the Democrats' ending of 2024 w/ 61 Senate seats).

Regarding Montana I screwed up in my math. The math didn't survive from my paper notebooks to here. You're right. I suppose we can do one of two three things:

1.) Montana narrowly votes Republican for Senate Bad outcome as Cordray won the state. Tester also won in 2018 so highly unlikely he would lose. First elected in 2006 he could theoretically retire.

2.) Change the Senate totals to 62 instead of 61 and make 2026 a 3 seat gain instead of 4 and we're okay.

3.) Tester resigns and a Republican is appointed. Montana elected a Republican Governor in 2020 and 2024. In theory Tester, for whatever reason, resigns in late 2024, making the majority 61, not 62. This is the cleanest retcon. It happened in 2000 with Paul Coverdell's death in Georgia that reduced the Republican majority in the Senate from 55 to 54. As a libertarian State Montana isn't really projected to be a Democratic state down the line.

I'll pick whatever is recommended. Good catch on my math btw.

It doesn't even need to be a retcon. Jon Tester could be Cordray's choice for Secretary of Agriculture or Secretary of the Interior or something. The Republican Governor appoints a Republican Placeholder, and Rs win the special election in 2025.