

Middle East 2015

CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the month of September 2015, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 7,400 adults in six Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) and Iran and Turkey. We had been commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of crises across the region including: the conflicts raging in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya; the situation in Palestine; the formation and utilization of a Joint Arab Force; the P5+1 agreement with Iran; and the threat posed by and the root causes of religious extremism. We also surveyed Iranians and Iraqis about developments within their countries and their expectations for the future.

What follows are our findings.

I. Four Conflicts

Iraq:

- **Majorities in every country covered in the survey agree that Daesh, in the first place, followed by the failure of the government in Baghdad to represent all Iraqis are the major factors causing conflict in Iraq.**
- Majorities in every country but Lebanon and Iraq itself also see Iran as a significant factor.
- **Among Iraqis there is a deep divide** with at least eight in 10 Sunni Arabs pointing principally to Iran and the failure of the government in Baghdad as the major causes of conflict. While fewer than three in 10 Sunnis see Daesh as a major factor behind the conflict, three-quarters of Shia Arabs point to Daesh as the major problem disrupting the country.
- When it comes to identifying the best outcome for the future of Iraq, in every country, except Lebanon and Iran, majorities support the creation of “a representative central government that can unify the country.” That same view is shared by at least pluralities of Iraqis of all sects and ethnicities.

Syria:

- **Majorities in every country, except Iran, point to the regime of Bashar al Assad as a major cause of the conflict raging in Syria.** Extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh are also held responsible for the continuing conflict by majorities in all countries surveyed.
- The involvement of Iranian-backed groups and Russia are identified as problems everywhere but Lebanon, with respect to the former, and Iran, with respect to the latter.
- As for the best outcome for Syria, Lebanon and Iran are the outliers. Strong majorities in every other country support “negotiations leading to a national unity government without Bashar al Assad.” On the other hand, one-half of Lebanese and Iranians favor either the establishment of a loose federation of regions or the partition of Syria.

Libya:

- Strong majorities in every country say that **the two main factors causing the conflict in Libya are tribal loyalties and the presence of extremist Islamist groups.**
- Majorities in all countries, except Lebanon, project a “strong central government” as the way to stabilize Libya. Lebanese are divided between that option and the establishment of a loose federation of regions.

Yemen:

- **The attempt by the Houthis and former President Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi is held to be the principal factor that prompted the conflict in Yemen in all countries except Lebanon and Iran.** These two outliers point to tribal rivalries as the major cause of the conflict in Yemen.
- There is substantial agreement across the board that the best solution for Yemen is “negotiations leading to a strong central government that can stabilize a unified Yemen.”

II. PALESTINE

Summary: The situation in Palestine is seen as an important concern for overwhelming majorities in every country surveyed. While Israel’s continued unwillingness to make peace has caused some erosion in Arab support for the Arab Peace Initiative (API), two-thirds or more of respondents in four of the six countries continue to support the API. But only in the UAE and Lebanon do respondents support Arab governments making confidence-building gestures to encourage Israel to make peace. Finally, in most Arab countries substantial majorities are in favor of their governments supporting Palestinian reconciliation and unity and providing more financial support to Palestinians.

The Arab Peace Initiative (API):

- As a result of Israel’s negative behavior since the Arab League endorsed its initiative for a comprehensive peace with Israel in 2002, **there has been some erosion in Arab public opinion’s support for the API.** Nevertheless, between two-thirds to three-quarters of all respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are still supportive of this goal—although pluralities do not believe that Israel is ready for peace. Only in Egypt and Iraq do majorities say that even if Israel accepts the API, they are “not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.”
- While more than three-quarters of Arabs in the UAE support Arab governments initiating some form of confidence-building measures to encourage Israel to make peace, that same percentage of Egyptians, Saudis, and Iraqis believe that Arab governments should refuse such contact until Israel makes peace with the Palestinians. Lebanese and Jordanians are divided.
- There is **strong support**, almost across the board, for Arab governments **to provide financial support to the Palestinian Authority and to support Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation and unity.** Iraqis are divided on the issue of financial support.

III. ARAB JOINT ACTION

Summary: Substantial majorities in every Arab country support the development of a Joint Arab Force (JAF). Of those who agree, majorities in all but the UAE think that their governments should supply manpower to such a force, and majorities everywhere but Lebanon and Iraq believe that their governments should provide financial support for the effort. Additionally, there is strong support for the JAF playing either a peace-keeping or combat role, when needed. Strong majorities also express support for deploying such a force in either Syria or Iraq, with Palestine also considered a priority in four of the six countries.

Forming a Joint Arab Force (JAF):

- Strong majorities across the board support the formation of a JAF to be deployed in conflict zones across the Arab region. In Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq there is some slight hesitation, with three in 10 disagreeing.
- Of those who agree with the formation of the JAF, majorities everywhere but the UAE would support their countries' supplying manpower to the JAF. And majorities in every country except Lebanon and Iraq agree to provide financial support.
- Strong majorities also would agree to seeing the JAF deployed to play either a combat or peace-keeping role, with the latter being the preferred option in four of the six countries.
- **When asked where they would see such a JAF deployed, majorities across the board pick Syria and Iraq**, with strong support for Palestine in four of the six countries covered in the survey.

IV. THE P5+1 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Summary: Respondents in most countries are not in support of the P5+1 agreement with Iran, feeling that the deal is good for Iran, but not for the region, and that it will not, in any case, succeed in limiting Iran's nuclear weapon's program. Opinions are divided as to whether Iran will use sanctions relief to improve its economy or to support its interference in the region.

- A substantial majority of respondents in UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are not supportive of the P5+1 deal with Iran. While a slight majority in Jordan is also opposed to the deal, a majority of Lebanese and Turks are supportive.
- A significant majority of Egyptians, Saudis, Arabs in the UAE, and Jordanians feel that the deal will only be good for Iran and not the Arab states; Lebanese and Turks are divided on this matter. And in every country but Turkey, majorities are not confident that the deal will succeed in limiting Iran's nuclear weapons program.
- **Across the board, respondents express concern with both Iran's nuclear program and its involvement in the region.** And Egyptians and Saudis express the greatest concern that Iran will use its relief from the sanctions to support its military and political interference in the region. Only in Lebanon does a substantial majority

believe that Iran will use sanctions relief to invest in improving its domestic situation. Respondents in other countries are divided in their opinion on this question.

V. EXTREMISM

Summary: Religious extremism is viewed as a serious challenge by respondents in every country, but there are some differences in attitudes as to what causes such extremism and how best to defeat it. **Daesh and al Qaeda lead the list** of groups that are identified as the most serious problems facing the region, although **the Gulf States and Egypt also identify groups supported by Iran as problematic**. It is not surprising that “ideas promoted by extremist religious figures and groups,” “corrupt, repressive and unrepresentative governments,” and “a lack of education” are identified as the major drivers causing religious extremism. But what is surprising is that “anger at the U.S.” and “foreign occupation” rank last. And while Saudi Arabia and Turkey receive better grades than others for the role they play in combating sectarian violence, the United States and Iran receive the lowest scores.

Extremist groups:

- Asked to rate the seriousness of the problem posed by several groups: Daesh, the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda, and militias supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG), majorities in all countries agree that Daesh and al Qaeda pose serious problems for the region. Attitudes are most intense in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey.
- A strong majority of respondents in most countries also agree that groups supported by the IRG pose a serious problem. The outliers are in Lebanon and Iraq where one-third to one-half say that these groups do not pose a problem.
- **A strong majority of respondents in the UAE see the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious problem**, while a strong majority in Turkey holds that the Brotherhood is no problem at all. About one-half of Egyptians, Iraqis, and Jordanians also feel that the Brotherhood is not a serious problem, as compared to only one-quarter of the respondents in these countries who say that the group is a serious problem.

The drivers of religious extremism:

- Respondents were given a list of eight factors that might account for driving religious extremist behavior: corrupt, repressive and unrepresentative governments; foreign occupations/interventions; religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas; support from foreign countries; anger at the United States; alienation of young people; poverty and lack of opportunity; and a lack of education. In almost every instance but one (“anger at the United States”), majorities in every country identify each of these factors as a “driver”—but with such differences in intensity that it is necessary to rank them in order of their degree of intensity. While the rankings vary from country to country, several observations can be made.
- In almost all the countries, **the top tier of factors identified as driving religious extremism include: religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas, corrupt, repressive and unrepresentative governments, and a lack of education.**

- **The bottom tier in almost every country include: anger at the United States, foreign occupations, and the alienation of youth.** It is interesting to note that despite being identified as an important factor by majorities in four of the eight countries, “anger at the United States” is ranked as the least important driver of extremism in every country.
- It is also worth noting that the rank order of “drivers” are identical in only two countries: Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The way to defeat extremist groups:

- In every country surveyed with the exception of Iran, majorities hold that **the most important ways to go about defeating violent extremist groups involve “changing the political and social realities that cause young people to be attracted to extremist ideas” followed by “countering the messages and ideas”** of the extremist groups.
- Respondents in the UAE most strongly support the use of military and police force to defeat extremist groups, an approach also strongly supported by Egyptians and Turks.

Role played in combating extremist sectarian violence:

- **The U.S. role in combating extremism is viewed as extremely negative in every country,** followed by Iran, which also gets negative scores across the board (except in Lebanon where attitudes on Iran’s role are split down the middle).
- Attitudes are divided on the roles played by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Three countries give Turkey and the UAE very positive scores, while Saudi Arabia’s role is viewed very positively in four countries.

VI. IRAQ (INTERNAL)

Summary: Iraq remains a deeply divided society with the three major component groups in the country (Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds) agreeing on very little.

They are divided in the level of confidence they demonstrate toward: the various institutions that exist in the country; the effectiveness of the various groups fighting against Daesh; and which group should be given the lead role in that fight.

There are, however, two notable areas where there is a convergence of views across the sectarian and ethnic divides: in identifying the principal factor causing the conflict in the country (“a government in Baghdad that doesn’t represent all Iraqis”) and in identifying the outcome that represents the best future for Iraq (“a representative central government that can unify the country”).

Cause of the conflict:

- **A majority of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds all agree that a principal cause of the conflict in Iraq is the fact that the central government has not represented all Iraqis.** While Shia and Kurds also point to Daesh as a principal cause, Sunnis disagree. At the same time, almost nine in 10 Sunnis and one-half of Kurds point to Iran as a source of the conflict, but less than one-fourth of Shia concur.

Confidence and effectiveness of groups fighting Daesh:

- When asked to rate their confidence in the central government, the military, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), their local tribal leadership, Daesh and the international coalition fighting Daesh: **Sunnis say they have no confidence in any of these entities**; Shia have confidence only in the military and the PMU; Kurds only have confidence in the same two groups, but to a lesser degree. And all Iraqi sub-groups agree that they have very little confidence in both their tribal leadership and the international coalition fighting Daesh.
- When asked to rate the effectiveness of the various entities fighting Daesh – the U.S.-led coalition, Iran, the Iraqi military, the PMU, and the Kurds: Shia rate all of them as effective except the U.S.-led coalition, while a majority of Kurds and Sunni Arabs only rate Kurdish fighters as effective.
- **The U.S.-led coalition, in other words, is rated ineffective by all groups of Iraqis.**

Iraq's future:

- **Majorities in all sectarian and ethnic groups say that the best way to ultimately resolve the conflict in Iraq is by “forming a more inclusive, representative government.”** And at least pluralities in all groups also maintain that the best future for Iraq lies not in partition or federation but in a “representative central government that can unify the country.”
- But these shared aspirations, while important to note, are tempered by the reality that overall fewer than three in 10 Iraqis have confidence that “in the next five years Iraqis will be able to form a government that is accepted by all segments of Iraqi society.”

VII. IRAN (INTERNAL)

Summary: Iranians demonstrate a set of conflicting attitudes in the aftermath of the P5+1 deal. They are overwhelmingly supportive of the deal, but are not pleased that their government accepted limits on its nuclear program. **They want their government to now focus resources on building the economy, increasing political freedoms,** and improving ties with the United States and their Arab neighbors, but they still support involvement in Syria, Iraq, etc. (though with lower levels of support than in 2014).

On the P5+1 deal and their nuclear program:

- **There is very strong support for the P5+1 deal**, with eight in 10 Iranians saying they approve of the agreement and believe that it is in the best interests of their country.
- This support is tempered by the fact that more than **two-thirds of Iranians believe it was a “bad idea” for the government to have “accepted limits on its nuclear program.”** And more than two-thirds also maintain that their country should have **nuclear weapons** either because Iran “is a major nation” or because “as long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them too.” As disturbing as this might be, this figure represents a substantial decline in the percentage of Iranians who, in 2014, felt that their country should have nuclear weapons.

Aftermath of the “deal”:

- Overall, there is a degree of optimism about the future in the post-agreement era with about one-half of Iranians believing that their situation will improve in the next three years, as opposed to only one in five who believe it will worsen. However, it is worth noting that these “better off/worse off” numbers are about the same as they were in 2013 and 2014.
- When asked what their government’s top priority should be at this point, far and away it is “investing in the economy and creating employment” (81%) and “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights” (75%). Six in 10 say it should be improving ties with the United States and the West and Arab countries. **Less than half want the government to give “greater support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.”**

Iran’s regional role:

- Despite this apparent shift in priorities, about seven in 10 still say their government’s involvement in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq are important. Only about four in 10 feel the same about involvement in Yemen and Afghanistan.

These percentages, however, reflect a substantial drop in support over the past year. In 2014, almost nine in 10 Iranians supported involvement in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, while six in 10 were in favor of involvement in Yemen.

- A potentially revealing finding: when Iranians are asked about how they envision their country’s regional role, **only two in 10 express the belief that Iran “should be the dominant player in the Gulf region.” More than four in 10 say that Iran “should not be involved in the region” and should instead focus on internal matters**, while another almost four in 10 say their government “should develop peaceful relations based on equality with other countries in the region.”

I. FOUR CONFLICTS

1. Iraq


Table 1: Cause of Conflict in Iraq: Government in Baghdad

How significant is the role played by a government in Baghdad that does not represent all Iraqis in causing conflict in Iraq?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
Significant	97	64	70	85	100	63	53	79
Not significant	3	37	30	16	<1	37	47	21

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses "very significant" and "somewhat significant." Not significant is the aggregation of the responses "not that significant" and "not significant at all."


The sentiment that a significant factor causing the conflict in Iraq is "the government in Baghdad does not represent all Iraqis" is considerably stronger among Sunnis.



Majorities of respondents in all countries surveyed say the fact that the government in Baghdad does not represent all Iraqis is a significant factor in causing the conflict in Iraq. This sentiment is strongest in UAE (100%), Egypt (97%), and Saudi Arabia (85%), followed by Turkey (79%) and Jordan (70%). In Lebanon and Iraq itself, more than six in 10 respondents say the lack of representation in the government is a significant causal factor for the overall conflict; in both countries, however, this sentiment is considerably stronger among Sunni respondents (Lebanon: 71% of Sunni vs. 54% of Shia; Iraq: 80% of Sunni vs. 57% of Shia). Among Kurds in Iraq, 61% note that this is a significant cause of the Iraq conflict. A slim majority in Iran (53%) also note the lack of representation in the government in Baghdad as a significant causal factor of the conflict in Iraq.

Table 2: Cause of Conflict in Iraq: Iranian Involvement							
How significant is the role played by Iranian involvement in causing conflict in Iraq?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY
Significant	94	41	72	75	85	42	82
Not significant	6	59	28	25	15	58	18
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses "very significant" and "somewhat significant." Not significant is the aggregation of the responses "not that significant" and "not significant at all."							

A major difference of opinion exists between Sunni and Shia respondents on the significance of Iranian involvement as a cause of the conflict in Iraq.



In five of the seven countries surveyed, large majorities consider Iranian involvement a significant factor in the Iraqi conflict: Egypt (94%), UAE (85%), Turkey (82%), Saudi Arabia (75%), and Jordan (72%). On the other hand, majorities in Lebanon (59%) and Iraq (58%) say Iranian involvement is not a significant factor. Again, we see a difference of opinion between Sunni and Shia respondents in these two countries. Among Sunni respondents, 63% in Lebanon and 87% in Iraq say Iranian involvement is a significant causal factor for the Iraqi conflict, while just 23% of Lebanese Shia and 24% of Iraqi Shia agree. In addition, the opinion of Iraqi Kurds splits this difference, with 52% noting the significance of Iranian involvement.

Table 3: Cause of Conflict in Iraq: Daesh								
How significant is the role played by Daesh* in causing conflict in Iraq?								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
Significant	97	83	76	91	100	61	88	94
Not significant	3	17	24	9	<1	39	12	6
*In Iraq, respondents were asked about "Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh." Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses "very significant" and "somewhat significant." Not significant is the aggregation of the responses "not that significant" and "not significant at all."								

Daesh is considered a significant factor in causing the Iraqi conflict by at least nine in 10 respondents in the UAE (100%), Egypt (97%), Turkey (94%), and Saudi Arabia (91%), followed by large majorities in Iran (88%), Lebanon (83%), and Jordan (76%), and 61% in Iraq itself. While there is little difference of opinion between Sunni and Shia respondents in Lebanon related to this factor (Sunni: 77% vs. Shia: 86%), there is considerable distance between the sects in Iraq, with 29% of Sunnis, 74% of Shia, and 60% of Kurds saying “Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh” are a significant factor in causing the conflict in Iraq.

Among sects in Iraq, considerable difference of opinion exists concerning the role of Sunni extremist groups as a cause of the conflict in Iraq.





Table 4: Best Future for Iraq								
Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Iraq?								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
A representative central government that can unify the country	89	36	58	67	69	59	32	78
The establishment of a loose federation of regions	10	46	32	31	28	19	40	15
Partition into three separate countries	1	18	10	2	3	22	28	7
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.								

In Iraq, Shia respondents are more favorable toward a representative central government than their Sunni and Kurdish counterparts.



When asked about the outcome that would represent the best future for Iraq, majorities in Egypt (89%), Turkey (78%), UAE (69%), Saudi Arabia (67%), Iraq (59%), and Jordan (58%) say the best outcome would be “a representative central government that can unify the country,” while pluralities in Lebanon (46%) and Iran (40%) opt for “the establishment of a loose federation of regions.” “Partition into three separate countries” is the least favored outcome in all countries surveyed, though 28% of those in Iran select this as the best choice. In Iraq, Shia respondents are more favorable toward a representative central government (68%) than their Sunni (41%) and Kurdish (52%) counterparts. Also of note are the more than one-third of Sunni Iraqis (36%) who favor partition.

2. Syria

Table 5: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Bashar al Assad

How significant is the role played by the regime of Bashar al Assad in causing conflict in Syria?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN	TURKEY
Significant	96	60	74	82	99	23	85
Not significant	4	41	26	18	1	77	15

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

A majority in all countries surveyed on this issue except Iran say that the regime of Bashar al Assad is a significant factor causing the conflict in Syria. There is near unanimity in the UAE (99%) and Egypt (96%); in both of these countries more than eight in 10 respondents call this factor “very significant” (83% and 84%, respectively). Strong majorities in Turkey

Everywhere but Iran, respondents believe “Bashar al Assad is a major cause of the conflict.”

(85%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and Jordan (74%) agree. In Lebanon, 60% of respondents also feel al Assad is a significant causal factor of the conflict in Syria, though this opinion is more prevalent among Sunni respondents (74%) than among Shia (55%) and Christians (56%). Only in Iran does the opposing view prevail; 77% of Iranians say al Assad is not a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict.

Table 6: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Sunni Extremist Groups Like al Qaeda and Daesh

How significant is the role played by Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh in causing conflict in Syria?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN	TURKEY
Significant	96	79	77	79	95	90	83
Not significant	4	21	23	21	5	10	17
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>							

There is even greater agreement regarding the significance of Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh in causing the conflict in Syria, with more than three-quarters of respondents in all countries surveyed holding this view. The widest majorities are found in Egypt (96%, with 71% saying “very significant”), UAE (95%), Iran (90%), and Turkey (83%), followed by Saudi Arabia (79%), Lebanon (79%), and Jordan (77%).

Table 7: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Iranian-Backed Groups

How significant is the role played by Iranian-backed groups like Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in causing conflict in Syria?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Significant	96	35	74	88	84	81
Not significant	4	65	26	12	16	19
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>						

With respect to Iranian-backed groups like Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, about three-quarters or more of those in Egypt (96%), Saudi Arabia (88%), UAE (84%), Turkey (81%), and Jordan (74%) believe these groups are a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict. A majority in Lebanon (65%), however, disagree, saying they are not significant. Lebanese opinion is split by sect, with 53% of Sunni respondents saying Iranian-backed groups are a significant factor in the Syrian conflict, while just 20% of Shia respondents and 33% of Christians agree.

Table 8: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Turkish and GCC Involvement				
How significant is the role played by Turkish and GCC involvement in causing conflict in Syria?				
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	IRAN
Significant	47	25	26	50
Not significant	53	75	74	50
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”				

Turkish and GCC involvement is not widely considered a significant factor in causing the conflict in Syria. Iranian opinion is evenly divided on this question (50% significant vs. 50% not significant), and Egyptian opinion is also split (47% vs. 53%). Only about one-quarter of respondents in Jordan (26%) and Lebanon (25%) say that Turkish and GCC involvement is a significant factor in the Syrian conflict.

Table 9: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Russia’s Support of al Assad							
How significant is the role played by the backing Russia gives to al Assad in causing conflict in Syria?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN	TURKEY
Significant	90	65	68	95	100	32	81
Not significant	10	35	33	5	<1	68	19
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”							

Everywhere but Iran, majorities of respondents say the backing Russia gives to al Assad is a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict. This view is strongest in the UAE (100%), Saudi Arabia (95%), Egypt (90%), and Turkey (81%); in the UAE and Egypt about three-quarters of respondents say it is a “very significant” factor. About two-thirds of those in Jordan (68%) and Lebanon (65%) view Russia’s backing of al Assad as significant to the conflict. Two-thirds of Iranians (68%) disagree, saying this is not a significant causal factor.

Table 10: Best Future for Syria							
Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Syria?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN	TURKEY
Negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad	88	36	58	74	97	15	90
Negotiations leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad	2	14	12	2	0	35	4
The establishment of a loose federation of regions	8	38	24	23	4	37	6
The partition of the country	2	12	6	1	0	13	0
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>							

There is a strong belief among those in UAE (97%), Turkey (90%), Egypt (88%), and Saudi Arabia (74%) that the best outcome for Syria would be “negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad.” A majority of Jordanians (58%) agree. Lebanese respondents are split between favoring a national unity government without al Assad’s involvement (36%) and “the establishment of a loose federation of regions” (38%). Iranian opinion is split between the loose federation of regions (37%) and “negotiations leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad” (35%); this latter option is favored by less than one in seven respondents in all other countries. The option with the least support in all surveyed countries is partition of the country.

3. LIBYA

Table 11: Cause of Conflict in Libya: Tribal Rivalries						
How significant is the role played by tribal rivalries in causing conflict in Libya?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Significant	97	67	72	86	100	89
Not significant	3	33	28	14	1	11
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>						

There is broad agreement in the six countries surveyed on the Libyan conflict that tribal rivalries are a significant causal factor. There is near unanimity in the UAE (100%) and Egypt (97%), followed by Turkey (89%) and Saudi Arabia (86%), and then Jordan (72%) and Lebanon (67%). The intensity of opinion is the only major variance, with one-third of Lebanese and Jordanian respondents viewing Libyan tribal rivalries as “very significant” compared to more than two times that many respondents in the UAE (92%), Egypt (78%), and Turkey (72%) noting the same.

Table 12: Cause of Conflict in Libya: Egyptian and GCC Involvement			
How significant is the role played by Egyptian and GCC involvement in causing conflict in Libya?			
	LEBANON	JORDAN	TURKEY
Significant	43	39	65
Not significant	57	61	35
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>			

Almost two-thirds of respondents in Turkey (65%) say that Egyptian and GCC involvement is a significant cause of the conflict in Libya. Among those in Lebanon and Jordan, however, only about four in 10 respondents note this a significant causal factor (Lebanon: 43%, Jordan: 39%).

Table 13: Cause of Conflict in Libya: Extremist Islamist Groups						
How significant is the role played by extremist Islamist groups in causing conflict in Libya?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Significant	75	73	77	83	96	69
Not significant	25	27	23	17	4	31
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>						

There is broad agreement, by more than two-thirds of all respondents, that extremist Islamist groups are a significant factor in causing the conflict in Libya. This view is strongest in the UAE (96%), where 81% say it is a “very significant” factor, followed by Saudi Arabia (83%), Jordan (77%), Egypt (75%), Lebanon (73%), and Turkey (69%). Majorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey also say these groups are “very significant.”

In Lebanon, where we find the lowest intensity of this opinion, with 29% calling extremist groups in Libya “very significant,” there are also some disparities by sect. Sunni respondents are the least likely to hold the view that these groups are significant (62%), while Shia (75%), Christian (78%), and Druze (84%) respondents are more likely to say so.

Table 14: Best Solution for Conflict in Libya						
What is the best solution to the conflict in Libya?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
A strong central government that can stabilize a unified country	85	43	56	72	92	80
The establishment of a loose federation of regions	14	41	38	24	7	17
The partition of the country	<1	17	6	5	<1	4
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>						

“A strong central government that can stabilize a unified” Libya is the best solution to the conflict according to majorities in the UAE (92%), Egypt (85%), Turkey (80%), Saudi Arabia (72%), and Jordan (56%). In Lebanon, opinion is split between those who favor a strong central government (43%) and those who favor “the establishment of a loose federation of regions” (41%); 38% of Jordanians concur that a loose federation would be the best solution in Libya. Partition of Libya is not considered a good solution by a sizable percentage of respondents in any country surveyed except Lebanon where 17% select this option.

4. YEMEN

Table 15: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Attempted Overthrow of Government

How significant is the role played by the attempt by the Houthis and former President Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi in causing conflict in Yemen?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN
Significant	98	50	80	82	100	25
Not significant	2	50	20	18	<1	75
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>						

When asked about the significance of the attempt by the Houthis and former president Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi, respondents in four of the six countries surveyed on the Yemeni conflict overwhelmingly say this is a significant causal factor. There is near unanimity in the UAE (100%) and Egypt (98%), where 90% and 87% of respondents, respectively, say it is a “very significant” factor. More than eight in 10 respondents in Saudi Arabia (82%) and Jordan (80%) concur. The Lebanese are evenly split on this question, though Sunni (60%) and Christian (55%) respondents are more likely to identify this as a significant factor than their Shia counterparts (36%). Finally, three-quarters of Iranians say the overthrow attempt is not a significant causal factor in the Yemeni conflict.

The attempt by Houthis and Saleh to overthrow the legitimate Hadi government is held as the main factor prompting the Yemen conflict.

Table 16: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Lack of Representation in Hadi Government						
How significant is the role played by the failure of the Hadi government to represent all segments of Yemeni society in causing conflict in Yemen?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN
Significant	59	57	54	68	98	55
Not significant	42	43	46	33	2	45
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>						

Majorities in all countries surveyed agree that the failure of the Hadi government to represent all segments of Yemeni society is a significant factor in causing the conflict in Yemen. However, while more than two-thirds of respondents in the UAE and Saudi Arabia point to this as a significant factor, majorities are slimmer elsewhere, with at least four in 10 respondents in Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and Lebanon saying this is not a significant factor in the conflict. In Lebanon, we again find more Sunni (65%) and Christian (54%) than Shia (47%) respondents noting this as a significant factor.

Table 17: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Tribal Rivalries						
How significant is the role played by tribal rivalries in causing conflict in Yemen?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN
Significant	64	72	75	78	94	67
Not significant	36	28	25	22	6	33
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>						

There is more consistent agreement that tribal rivalries are a significant factor causing conflict in Yemen, with more than two-thirds of respondents holding this view in five of the six countries surveyed including the UAE (94%), Saudi Arabia (78%), Jordan (75%), Lebanon (72%), and Iran (67%), as well as 64% of Egyptians.

Table 18: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Iranian Involvement					
How significant is the role played by Iranian involvement in causing conflict in Yemen?					
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE
Significant	95	35	71	71	88
Not significant	5	65	29	29	13
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”</i>					

Iranian involvement is viewed as a significant causal factor by at least seven in 10 respondents in Egypt (95%), the UAE (88%), Saudi Arabia (71%), and Jordan (71%). The opposite point of view, that Iranian involvement is not significant to the Yemeni conflict, is held by

65% of Lebanese. Among the Lebanese, the sectarian divide is again notable, with 59% of Sunni respondents saying Iran is significant to the Yemeni conflict, while just 22% of Shia and 28% of Christians agree.

Table 19: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: GCC Involvement

How significant is the role played by GCC involvement in causing conflict in Yemen?				
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	IRAN
Significant	89	49	33	64
Not significant	11	51	67	36

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Among Egyptians, 89% say GCC involvement is a significant factor in causing conflict in Yemen; 64% of Iranians agree. The Lebanese are split on this question with 49% saying GCC involvement is significant, while 51% say it is not. Finally, just one-third of Jordanians note this as a significant causal factor of conflict in Yemen, with two-thirds saying it is not significant.

Table 20: Best Solution to Conflict in Yemen

What is the best solution to the conflict in Yemen?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAN
Negotiations leading to a strong central government that can stabilize a unified country	96	72	86	89	97	66
The partition of the country	4	28	14	11	3	34

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Overwhelmingly, respondents in all six countries agree that the best solution to the conflict in Yemen is “negotiations leading to a strong central government that can stabilize a unified country.” This opinion is strongest in the UAE (97%), Egypt (96%), Saudi Arabia (89%), and Jordan (86%). Though more than two-thirds of respondents in Lebanon (72%) and Iran (66%) agree, each has a sizable percentage who feel partition of Yemen could be the best solution (28% and 34%, respectively).

II. PALESTINE

Table 21: View of Arab Peace Initiative, 2009* and 2015

In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?

	Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		KSA		UAE		Iraq
	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2015
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	14	8	34	26	36	37	37	19	10	23	14
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	52	26	47	45	49	40	44	45	70	58	27
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.**	8	66	18	30	13	24	18	36	8	19	59
Not sure	22	N/A	2	N/A	2	N/A	1	N/A	12	N/A	N/A


* Zogby International, Six-Nation Arab Opinion Poll, November 1-18, 2009. Sample size: 3,989 adults.

** In 2009, this option was "Even if the Israelis return all of the territories occupied in 1967 peacefully, the Arabs should continue to fight Israel no matter what the outcome."

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

There has been some erosion in Arab public opinion support for the API.

In both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, you can see a marked increase from 2009 to 2015 in the percentage of respondents who are not prepared for peace with Israel.



In our most recent polling, more than one-third of Jordanian respondents (37%) say they are prepared for peace with Israel if it agrees to the Arab Peace Initiative, and they want effort to be made to achieve that goal. About one-quarter of those in Lebanon (26%) and UAE (23%) agree.

A majority of those in the UAE (58%) and pluralities in Lebanon (45%), Saudi Arabia (45%), and Jordan (40%) say they are prepared for peace with Israel, but do not believe that the Israelis will give up the territories. One-quarter of respondents in Iraq (27%) and Egypt (26%) agree.

Finally, majorities in Egypt (66%) and Iraq (59%) are not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel, even if Israel agrees to the Arab Peace Initiative. Significant percentages in Saudi Arabia (36%), Lebanon (30%), and Jordan (24%) also say they are not ready for peace.

Comparing the current data to the results of polling in 2009 on the same question, we find that in all countries surveyed there have been marked increases in the percentages of respondents who are not prepared for peace with Israel. In Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE these increases are about twofold (Lebanon: 18% to 30%, Jordan: 13% to 24%, Saudi Arabia: 18% to 36%, UAE: 8% to 19%), while in Egypt we find an exponential rise (8% to 66%).

Table 22: Arab Governments and Israel						
With which statement do you most agree?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ
Arab governments should initiate confidence-building gestures toward Israel in order to encourage Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.	25	54	49	27	77	14
Arab governments should continue to refuse contact with Israel until Israel makes peace with the Palestinians.	75	46	51	73	23	86

More than three-quarters of respondents in the UAE (77%) say Arab governments should initiate confidence-building gestures toward Israel to encourage Israel to make peace with the Palestinians. A majority of Lebanese (54%) agree. However, at least seven in 10 respondents in Iraq (86%), Egypt (75%), and Saudi Arabia (73%) think that Arab governments should continue to refuse contact with Israel until Israel makes peace with the Palestinians.

Opinion in Jordan is evenly split between those who think Arab governments should attempt to boost the confidence of Israel to encourage peace (49%) and those who think Arab governments should continue to refuse contact with Israel (51%).

Table 23: Financial Assistance for Palestinians						
How important would it be for your government to provide more financial assistance to support the Palestinians under occupation?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	IRAQ
Important	96	80	86	93	100	48
Not important	4	20	14	7	<1	52

** KSA and UAE citizens only.*
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Important is the aggregation of the responses “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of the responses “not so important” and “not important at all.”


With the exception of Iraqis, there is broad agreement among respondents that it is very important for their governments to provide more financial assistance to support the Palestinians under occupation. There is near unanimity among Emiratis (100%), of whom 97% say it is “very important,” followed by high numbers of Egyptians (96%), Saudis (93%), Jordanians (86%), and Lebanese (80%) who think their governments should provide more financial support to the Palestinians. In Iraq, opinion is split between 48% who say it is important for their governments to participate in this way and 52% who say it is not important.

Table 24: Support for Palestinian National Reconciliation and Unified Governance

How important would it be for your government to support Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation and unified governance?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	IRAQ
Important	98	76	87	93	100	71
Not important	2	24	13	7	<1	29
<p><i>* KSA and UAE citizens only.</i></p> <p><i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Important is the aggregation of the responses “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of the responses “not so important” and “not important at all.”</i></p>						

When asked about the importance of their governments’ supporting Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation and unified governance, at least seven in 10 respondents in all countries surveyed say it is important, including 100% of Emiratis, 98% of Egyptians, 93% of Saudis, and 87% of Jordanians, followed by 76% of Lebanese and 71% of Iraqis.

A majority of respondents agree it is very important to provide financial assistance to occupied Palestine and support Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation.



III. ARAB JOINT ACTION

Table 25: Development of Joint Arab Force

Do you agree or disagree with the idea of developing a joint Arab force to deploy in conflict zones across the Arab region?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	IRAQ
Agree	93	71	70	84	89	67
Disagree	7	29	30	16	11	33
<i>*KSA and UAE citizens only. Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Agree is the aggregation of the responses "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." Disagree is the aggregation of the responses "somewhat disagree" and "strongly disagree."</i>						

When asked about developing a joint Arab force to deploy in conflict zones across the Arab region, majorities in all six countries surveyed agree to this idea. The strongest support comes from Egyptians (93%), Emiratis (89%), and Saudis (84%), followed by the Lebanese (71%), Jordanians (70%), and Iraqis (67%). It is noteworthy that among Iraqis the level of agreement varies by sect; Sunni respondents (80%) are more likely to agree to the development of a joint Arab force than their Shia counterparts (60%).

Table 26: Your Country's Contribution to Joint Arab Force

What should your country contribute to the formation of a joint Arab force?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	IRAQ
Manpower	29	37	31	23	2	36
Financial support	18	22	27	34	65	17
Manpower and financial support	50	27	32	40	33	27
No contribution from my country	3	14	10	3	1	20
<i>*KSA and UAE citizens only Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>						

Those who agree with the idea of developing a joint Arab force were asked what their country should contribute to the formation of a joint Arab force: manpower, financial support, both of these, or no contribution.

Emiratis are the most consistent in their response, with 98% saying the UAE should contribute financial support and about one-third of these (33%) saying manpower should also be contributed to this effort. About three-quarters of Saudis also view financial support from their country as an appropriate contribution, with 40% overall saying manpower should also be contributed.

Among Egyptians, more than three-quarters (79%) say their country should contribute manpower to a joint Arab force, and 50% say financial support should also be contributed.

Opinion is somewhat mixed in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. About one-third of those in Lebanon (37%) and Iraq (36%) say manpower is the appropriate contribution for their countries, and an additional one-quarter in each of these countries say they should contribute both manpower and financial support. Jordanians are almost evenly split among those who would see their country contribute manpower (31%), financial support (27%), or both (32%). There is a significant percentage of respondents in each of these three countries who feel their countries should not contribute to a joint Arab force (Iraq: 20%, Lebanon: 14%, Jordan: 10%).

Table 27: Use of a Joint Arab Force						
If such a force were to be formed, should it be...						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	IRAQ
Deployed only in a peace-keeping role in Arab countries, when needed.	18	39	33	29	16	38
Deployed in a combat role in Arab countries, when needed.	23	24	22	24	47	29
Available to be deployed to play either role, when needed to provide peace and security in Arab countries.	60	37	45	48	37	33
<i>*KSA and UAE citizens only</i> <i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>						

Those who agree with the idea of a joint Arab force were asked if such a force should be deployed only for peace-keeping, only for combat, or for either role when needed. An exclusively peace-keeping role is favored by at least one-third of respondents in Lebanon (39%), Iraq (38%), and Jordan (33%), as well as 29% of Saudi citizens. Fewer than two in 10 Egyptians (18%) and Emiratis (16%) think a joint Arab force should be limited in deployment to peace-keeping.

An exclusively combat role in Arab countries is favored by 47% of citizens in the UAE, 29% of those in Iraq, and less than one-quarter of Lebanese (24%), Saudi (24%), Egyptian (23%), and Jordanian (22%) respondents.

A majority of Egyptians (60%) and pluralities of those in Jordan (45%) and Saudi Arabia (48%) think that a joint Arab force should be available to be deployed in either a peace-keeping or a combat role in Arab countries, when needed. There is agreement about these dual roles from 37% of those in the UAE, as well as 37% of Lebanese and 33% of Iraqis. There is little variance in these opinions by sect in Lebanon; however, among Iraqis, one-half of Shia respondents would see such a force limited to peace-keeping operations, compared to just 20% of Sunni respondents.

Table 28: Conflict Deployments for Joint Arab Force

If such a force were to be formed, in which of the following conflicts should it be deployed?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	IRAQ
Iraq	79	69	80	66	50	79
Syria	94	75	65	75	82	74
Libya	68	42	25	38	14	22
Yemen	55	55	13	34	15	25
Palestine	77	73	91	65	47	37
<i>*KSA and UAE citizens only</i>						

A majority of respondents who agree with the development of a joint Arab force think that such a force should be deployed in Iraq and Syria. With respect to Iraq, support for deployment is highest in Jordan (80%), Iraq itself (79%), and Egypt (79%), and lowest among citizens in the UAE (50%). With respect to Syria, support for deployment is highest among Egyptians (94%) and Emiratis (82%), and lowest among Jordanians (65%).

In four of the six countries, majorities would favor deployment of a joint Arab force in Palestine, including Jordan (91%), Egypt (77%), Lebanon (73%), and Saudi Arabia (65%). There is considerably less support from citizens in the UAE (47%) and Iraq (37%).

Two-thirds of Egyptians (68%) would see a joint Arab force deployed in Libya, while there is significantly less support for such action elsewhere including 42% of Lebanese, 38% of Saudis, and less than one-quarter of Jordanians (25%), Iraqis (22%), and Emiratis (14%).

Finally, majorities in Egypt (55%) and Lebanon (55%) would support deployment in Yemen, but about one-third or fewer of respondents agree in Saudi Arabia (34%), Iraq (25%), UAE (15%), and Jordan (13%).

Only among Saudi nationals do we find a significant sectarian divide, where Sunni respondents are less likely than their Shia counterparts to support deployment in any conflict, with as much as 19 points dividing them. The greatest differences are with respect to deployment in Iraq (Sunni: 63% vs. Shia: 82%) and Libya (Sunni: 35% vs. Shia: 54%).

Wide Arab support for the development of a Joint Arab Force exists.

Table 29: Important Concerns for Your Government							
Do you agree or disagree that the situation in ... should be an important concern for your government?							
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA*	UAE*	TURKEY
Iraq	Agree	93	79	80	90	100	98
	Disagree	7	21	20	10	0	3
Syria	Agree	96	82	78	92	99	92
	Disagree	4	18	22	9	1	8
Libya	Agree	93	75	68	85	97	96
	Disagree	7	25	32	15	3	4
Yemen	Agree	92	73	74	86	96	89
	Disagree	8	27	27	14	4	11
Palestine	Agree	96	81	85	92	98	86
	Disagree	4	19	15	8	2	14
<i>*KSA and UAE citizens only</i> <i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Agree is the aggregation of the responses "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." Disagree is the aggregation of the responses "somewhat disagree" and "strongly disagree."</i>							

When asked about the situations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Palestine, there is broad agreement among respondents that these are important concerns for their governments. At least two-thirds of respondents in all countries surveyed on these questions (in many cases far more), note the importance of these situations for their governments.

IV. THE P5+1 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Table 30: Support for Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Agreement

How supportive are you of the nuclear agreement concluded between the P5+1 and Iran?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Supportive	37	63	47	38	9	55
Not supportive	63	37	53	62	91	45
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Supportive is the aggregation of the responses “very supportive” and “somewhat supportive.” Not supportive is the aggregation of the responses “not so supportive” and “not supportive at all.”</i>						

Majorities of respondents in Lebanon (63%) and Turkey (55%) are supportive of the nuclear agreement made between the P5+1 and Iran. In Jordan, opinion leans toward opposition, with 47% in support and 53% not in support of the agreement. Majorities in Egypt (63%) and Saudi Arabia (62%), and nine in 10 respondents in the UAE (91%), are not supportive of the agreement. A majority of those in the UAE (66%) say they are “not supportive at all.”

Table 31: Opinion of Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Agreement

Is the nuclear agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran ... ?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Good for everyone in the region, Iran and the Arab States	23	51	35	31	21	52
Only good for Iran, but bad for the Arab States	77	49	66	69	79	48
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>						

Opinion is split in Lebanon and Turkey with regard to whose interests are served by the agreement. In both of these countries, a slim majority (51% and 52%, respectively) say the agreement is “good for everyone in the region, Iran and the Arab States.” On the other hand, at least two-thirds of those in the UAE (79%), Egypt (77%), Saudi Arabia (69%), and Jordan (66%) say the agreement is “only good for Iran, but bad for the Arab States.”

In Lebanon, we find that Shia respondents are more likely to view the agreement as positive for both Iran and the Arab States (66%) than their Sunni (51%) and Christian (37%) counterparts.

Table 32: Confidence in Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Agreement

How confident are you that the agreement will succeed in limiting Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapons program?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Confident	37	44	43	32	13	54
Not confident	63	57	57	68	87	46
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Confident is the aggregation of the responses "very confident" and "somewhat confident." Not confident is the aggregation of the responses "not so confident" and "not confident at all."</i>						

Majorities in all countries surveyed except Turkey are not confident that the agreement will succeed in limiting Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapons program, with the greatest lack of confidence in the UAE (87%), followed by Saudi Arabia (68%), Egypt (63%), Jordan (57%), and Lebanon (57%). Among the Lebanese, a slim majority of Shia respondents (52%) do have confidence in the agreement's ability to limit Iran's nuclear program, while Sunni (42%) and Christian (37%) respondents are less likely to have this confidence. Only in Turkey does an overall majority (54%) have confidence that the agreement will limit Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Table 33: Concerns About Iran

In your opinion, what is of greater concern?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Iran's involvement in other countries in the region	14	21	31	23	24	18
Iran's nuclear program	16	37	37	29	20	12
Both equally	44	8	23	34	38	59
Iran is not a problem	26	33	9	14	18	10
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>						

When asked to consider which is of greater concern, Iran's involvement in other countries in the region or Iran's nuclear program, opinion is mixed. Pluralities in Lebanon (37%) and Jordan (37%) are more concerned about Iran's nuclear program, though about one-third of Jordanians are more concerned by Iran's regional involvements and one-third of Lebanese say Iran is not a problem. Pluralities in Turkey (59%), Egypt (44%), UAE (38%), and Saudi Arabia (34%) are equally concerned with Iran's nuclear program and their regional involvement.

Table 34: Use of Sanctions Relief by Iran

Now that a nuclear deal with Iran has been reached, which do you believe is most likely to occur?						
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to invest in improving its economy and domestic situation.	10	66	54	34	52	48
Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to support its military and political interference in regional affairs.	90	34	46	66	48	52

In Lebanon and Jordan, majorities believe that Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to invest in improving its economy and domestic situation (66% and 54%, respectively). Taking the contrary view are 90% of Egyptians and 66% of those in Saudi Arabia who believe that Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to support its military and political interference in regional affairs. Respondents in the UAE and Turkey are split on this issue (52% vs. 48% and 48% vs. 52%, respectively).

Respondents in most countries are not supportive of the P5+1 deal.

V. EXTREMISM

Table 35: Extremist Groups

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “a serious problem” and 5 being “no problem at all”), how serious a problem is each of the following groups?		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
Daesh	Problem	100 (1)	58 (1)	65 (2)	88 (1)	100 (1)	76 (1)	74 (1)	95 (2)
	Not a problem	<1	11	17	4	0	13	5	2
Muslim Brotherhood	Problem	25 (3)	42 (3)	27 (4)	23 (4)	68 (4)	26 (4)	54 (3)	12 (4)
	Not a problem	51	20	57	46	10	52	19	81
Al Qaeda	Problem	97 (2)	52 (2)	71 (1)	85 (2)	97 (2)	60 (2)	71 (2)	98 (1)
	Not a problem	1	8	15	4	0	15	5	1
Milicias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard	Problem	97 (2)	19 (4)	64 (3)	81 (3)	88 (3)	41 (3)		85 (3)
	Not a problem	1	49	17	8	7	36		14
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of “3” are not included. Problem is the aggregation of the responses of 1 and 2. Not a problem is the aggregation of the responses of 4 and 5. The rank of each group in each country by level of “problem” ratings appears in parentheses.</i>									

Respondents in all eight countries were asked about their opinions of four groups: Daesh, the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda, and militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. They were asked to rate how serious a problem each of these groups is on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “a serious problem” and 5 is “no problem at all.” The above table shows the percentages of respondents who selected 1 or 2 (“problem”) and 4 or 5 (“not a problem”) for each group, as well as a ranking of how problematic the four groups are from the perspective of respondents in each of the eight countries.

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
1	Daesh	Daesh	Al Qaeda	Daesh	Daesh	Daesh	Daesh	Al Qaeda
2	Al Qaeda Militias+	Al Qaeda	Daesh	Al Qaeda	Al Qaeda	Al Qaeda	Al Qaeda	Daesh
3	MB	MB	Militias+	Militias+	Militias+	Militias+	MB	Militias+
4		Militias+	MB	MB	MB	MB		MB

Majorities of respondents in all eight countries identify both Daesh and al Qaeda as problematic. In six of the eight countries, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, respondents rank Daesh as the most problematic followed by al Qaeda. In Turkey and Jordan, al Qaeda is identified as most problematic followed by Daesh. When looking more deeply at subgroups in Lebanon, we find that Christians are more likely to view al Qaeda and Daesh as a problem (60% and 68%, respectively) than their Sunni (44% and 51%) and Shia (46% and 49%) counterparts. In Iraq we find that Shia are more likely to view these two groups as a problem (al Qaeda: 67%, Daesh: 80%) than their Sunni countrymen (al Qaeda: 45%, Daesh: 67%).

Overall, militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are ranked third among the four groups in terms of being a problem. But opinions with respect to these groups are the most variable among the eight countries. More than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (97%), UAE (88%), Turkey (85%), and Saudi Arabia (81%) say these groups are a serious problem; a majority in Jordan (64%) agree. However, opinion is divided in Iraq (problem: 41% vs. not a problem: 36%). This split is largely along sectarian lines; Sunni respondents in Iraq are far more likely to say these groups are a problem (78% vs. 13%) than their Shia counterparts (22% vs. 47%). Finally, about one-half of those in Lebanon (49%) do not feel these groups are a problem, while just 19% call groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard a problem. A sectarian gap is also evident among the Lebanese, where Shia (12% vs. 57%) and Christian (18% vs. 51%) respondents say these groups are not a problem by margins of three or four to one, while Sunni respondents are basically split (30% vs. 35%).

The Muslim Brotherhood is the group least likely of these four to be identified as a problem in all countries except Lebanon. Majorities of respondents in the UAE (68%) and Iran (54%) say the Brotherhood is a problem, and a plurality in Lebanon agrees (42% vs. 20% who say it is not a problem). About one-quarter of respondents in Jordan (27%), Iraq (26%), Egypt (25%), and Saudi Arabia (23%), and just 12% in Turkey say the Muslim Brotherhood is a problem.

Again, looking at the differences among sectarian groups, we find Shia in Iraq twice as likely as their Sunni counterparts to see the Brotherhood as problematic (32% vs. 15%). Similarly, Lebanese Shia and Christians are more likely than Sunnis in their country to say the Muslim Brotherhood is a problem (Shia: 50%, Christian: 45%, Sunni: 31%).

Table 36: Drivers of Religious Extremism

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “a very important factor” and 5 being “not an important factor at all”), how important a role do each of the following play in driving religious extremism?								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
1	Foreign funding	Lack of education	Lack of education	Corrupt governments	Corrupt governments	Poverty	Religious ideas	Corrupt governments
2	Poverty	Religious ideas	Corrupt governments	Religious ideas	Religious ideas	Corrupt governments	Lack of education	Youth alienation
3	Corrupt governments (tie)	Corrupt governments	Religious ideas	Lack of education	Lack of education	Religious ideas	Youth alienation	Poverty
4	Religious ideas (tie)	Foreign occupations (tie)	Poverty	Poverty	Poverty	Foreign occupations	Poverty	Religious ideas
5	Foreign occupations	Foreign funding (tie)	Youth alienation	Foreign funding	Foreign funding	Youth alienation	Foreign funding	Lack of education
6	Lack of education	Poverty	Foreign occupations	Youth alienation	Youth alienation	Lack of education	Foreign occupations	Foreign occupations
7	Youth alienation	Youth alienation	Foreign funding	Foreign occupations	Foreign occupations	Foreign funding	Corrupt governments	Foreign funding
8	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.
<i>Note: Rankings are based on the percentage of respondents who rate the factor as either 1 or 2.</i>								

Respondents were asked to rate the importance of eight factors that drive religious extremism:

- Corrupt, repressive, and unrepresentative governments
- Foreign occupations/interventions
- Religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas and/or incorrect religious interpretations
- Foreign countries providing funding and training
- Anger at the United States

Top causes of extremism: religious figures promoting extremist ideas, repressive governments, poor education

- The alienation and frustration of young people
- Poverty/lack of opportunity
- Lack of education

Overall, majorities in most countries rate all of these factors as important. “Corrupt, repressive, and unrepresentative governments” and “religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas and/or incorrect religious interpretations” are the top two most important factors in driving religious extremism. Corrupt governments is the highest rated factor in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey, and places second in Jordan and Iraq. Religious ideas is the highest rated only in Iran, but places second in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.

“Lack of education” and “poverty/lack of opportunity” are the next two highest rated factors driving religious extremism. Lack of education is noted as the most important factor by Lebanese and Jordanians, and is in the second position in Iran. Poverty is recognized as the most important factor driving religious extremism by Iraqis, and is ranked second by Egyptians.

“Foreign countries providing funding and training,” “the alienation and frustration of young people,” and “foreign occupations/interventions” are generally rated in the bottom half of factors driving religious extremism. However, foreign funding is the top factor among Egyptians, and the alienation of youth is ranked high in Turkey and Iran.

“Anger at the United States” is the least important factor in all countries surveyed, though majorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey do note it as important.

Table 37: Defeating Violent Extremist Groups

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “the most important” and 5 being “the least important”), how important are the following to the effort to defeat violent extremist groups?									
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
Use of military and police force	Most Important	95	32	47	78	97	59	47	93
	Least important	2	47	44	15	<1	27	34	3
Countering the messages and ideas promoted by recruiters for extremist groups	Most Important	95	52	57	82	98	65	48	85
	Least important	1	24	17	8	1	14	31	11
Changing the political and social realities that cause young people to be attracted to extremist ideas	Most Important	97	55	61	83	96	74	42	92
	Least important	<1	22	26	9	1	16	31	6
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of “3” are not included. Most important is the aggregation of responses of 1 and 2. Least important is the aggregation of responses of 4 and 5.</i>									

Majorities in seven of the eight countries surveyed say that “changing the political and social realities that cause young people to be attracted to extremist ideas” is important to defeating violent extremist groups. There is near unanimity in Egypt (97%) and UAE (96%), followed by high levels of agreement in Turkey (92%), Saudi Arabia (83%), and Iraq (74%). Changing the realities of young people’s lives is also considered the most important effort by Jordanians (61%) and Lebanese (55%). Only in Iran is this strategy called important by less than a majority (42%).

“Countering the messages and ideas promoted by recruiters for extremist groups” is also considered important by majorities in all countries surveyed except Iran (where 48% say it’s important).

The “use of military and police force” is deemed important by almost all respondents in UAE (97%), Egypt (95%), and Turkey (93%), and majorities in Saudi Arabia (78%) and Iraq (59%). Less than half of the respondents in Jordan (47%) and Iran (47%) and one-third of those in Lebanon (32%) call use of the military and police important for defeating violent extremist groups.

Table 38: Combating Extremist Sectarian Violence									
How do you evaluate the role played by each of the following countries in combating extremist sectarian violence?									
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	IRAN	TURKEY
United States	Positive	16	17	31	15	11	10	7	22
	Negative	85	83	69	85	89	90	93	78
UAE	Positive	86	39	60	79		25	15	16
	Negative	14	61	40	21		75	85	84
Turkey	Positive	53	50	74	59	63	43	38	
	Negative	47	50	26	42	38	57	62	
Iran	Positive	5	50	1	14	11	36		23
	Negative	95	50	99	86	89	64		77
Saudi Arabia	Positive	92	40	68		91	39	13	84
	Negative	8	61	32		9	61	87	16
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Positive is the aggregation of the responses “a very positive role” and “a somewhat positive role.” Negative is the aggregation of the responses “a somewhat negative role” and “a very negative role.”</i>									

Turkey gets the most consistently positive reviews for its role in combating extremist sectarian violence, including majorities in Jordan (74%), UAE (63%), Saudi Arabia (59%), and Egypt (53%). Opinion is evenly split in Lebanon, while majorities in Iraq (57%) and Iran (62%) view Turkey’s role as negative.

The roles of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are viewed positively by wide margins in some countries. Saudi Arabia’s top ratings come from Egypt (92%), UAE (91%), and Turkey (84%), and a majority in Jordan (68%), while four in 10 respondents in Lebanon (40%) and Iraq

(39%) and just 13% in Iran think the Kingdom's role is positive. The UAE's top ratings come from Egypt (86%), Saudi Arabia (79%), and Jordan (60%), while 39% of Lebanese and fewer than one-quarter of respondents in Iraq (25%), Turkey (16%), and Iran (15%) see the UAE as playing a positive role in combating extremist sectarian violence.

The roles of the United States and Iran in combating extremist sectarian violence are viewed the most negatively. In Jordan, 31% of respondents view the United States' role as positive; in the other seven countries surveyed fewer than one-quarter of respondents see the U.S. role as positive. With respect to Iran, Lebanese opinion is evenly split between positive and negative, and 36% of Iraqis view Iran's role as positive, while fewer than one-quarter of respondents in the other countries surveyed agree.

VI. IRAQ (INTERNAL)


Table 39: Confidence in Leaders/Groups in Iraq

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 meaning “great confidence” and 5 meaning “no confidence at all”) how much confidence do you have in each of the following?

RANK			ALL IRAQIS	SUNNI	SHIA	KURDS
1	The Iraqi military	Confident	55	17	68	52
		Not confident	26	48	17	28
2	Popularization Mobilization Units	Confident	48	6	61	47
		Not confident	37	71	26	38
3	The leadership of the central government in Baghdad	Confident	19	5	24	19
		Not confident	55	74	48	59
4	My local/tribal leadership	Confident	18	14	20	16
		Not confident	50	48	48	51
5	The effort being made by the international coalition fighting Daesh	Confident	15	2	19	16
		Not confident	71	90	65	72
6	The leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government	Confident	14	17	12	19
		Not confident	42	15	54	34
7	Daesh	Confident	6	16	3	5
		Not confident	88	74	93	88

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of “3” are not included. Confident is the aggregation of the responses of 1 and 2. Not confident is the aggregation of the responses of 4 and 5. The leaders/groups are listed in rank order based on the percentages of 1 and 2 responses.

A deep sectarian divide exists in the confidence Iraqis feel toward the military and the Popular Mobilization Units.




Iraqis were asked to rate their confidence in a number of groups operating in their country. The only group to earn the confidence of a majority of Iraqis is the military (55%); a close second is taken by the Popular Mobilization Units (48%). In both cases, however, there is a deep sectarian divide at work. While among Shia 68% have confidence in the military and 61% have confidence in the Popular Mobilization Units, among Sunnis just 17% and 6%, respectively, share this confidence. (Kurds have a fair degree of confidence in both of these groups—military: 52% and PMUs: 47%.)

No other leadership or group garners the confidence of 20% of the Iraqi people. The confidence level for the leadership of the central government in Baghdad is 19% (Sunni: 5%, Shia: 24%, Kurds: 19%), for local and tribal leadership 18% (Sunni: 14%, Shia: 20%, Kurds: 16%), for the effort being made by the international coalition fighting Daesh 15% (Sunni: 2%, Shia: 19%, Kurds: 16%), for the leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government 14% (Sunni: 17%, Shia: 12%, Kurds: 19%), and for Daesh just 6% having confidence (Sunni: 16%, Shia: 3%, Kurds: 5%) and 88% saying they have no confidence.

Table 40: Effective Actors Against Daesh						
How effective have each of the following actors been in the conflict against Daesh?						
RANK			ALL IRAQIS	SUNNI	SHIA	KURDS
1	The forces of the Kurdish Regional Government	Effective	57	60	55	60
		Ineffective	43	40	45	40
2	Popular Mobilization Units	Effective	50	7	67	42
		Ineffective	50	93	33	58
3	The central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military	Effective	47	18	60	38
		Ineffective	53	82	40	63
4	Iran	Effective	45	5	61	39
		Ineffective	55	95	39	61
5	The U.S.-led international coalition	Effective	15	21	13	22
		Ineffective	85	79	88	78
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Effective is the aggregation of the responses “very effective” and “somewhat effective.” Ineffective is the aggregation of the responses “somewhat ineffective” and “very ineffective.” The leaders/ groups are listed in rank order based on the percentages of “effective” responses.						

Shia respondents are far more likely to find the Popular Mobilization Units, Iran, Baghdad's central government, and the Iraqi military effective than their Sunni counterparts.



When asked to rate the effectiveness of five actors in the conflict against Daesh, Iraqis rate the forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (57%) highest, followed by the Popular Mobilization Units (50%), the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military (47%), and Iran (45%). The U.S.-led international coalition is ranked last with just 15% of Iraqis saying it has been effective.

Again, we find a significant sectarian divide on these questions. Shia respondents are far more likely to find the Popular Mobilization Units effective than their Sunni counterparts (67% vs. 7%), and the same is true for Iran (61% vs. 5%) and the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military (60% vs. 18%).

Table 41: Leading Struggle Against Daesh

Which of the following actors should be given the lead role in the struggle against Daesh?				
	ALL IRAQIS	SUNNI	SHIA	KURD
The central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military	43	23	52	33
The Popular Mobilization Units	18	3	25	16
The forces of the Kurdish Regional Government	17	37	7	23
The local tribal leadership	16	26	13	18
The U.S.-led international coalition	6	11	4	11
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>				

Despite the effectiveness ratings (see Table 40), when asked which of the actors should be given the lead role in the struggle against Daesh, a plurality of Iraqi respondents (43%) point to the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military. Fewer than one in five respondents say the lead role should fall to the Popular Mobilization Units (18%), the forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (17%), and the local tribal leadership (16%). Only 6% of respondents say the U.S.-led international coalition should have the lead role in fighting Daesh.

While more than one-half of Shia respondents (52%) say the lead role should be given to the Iraqi government and military, just one-quarter of Sunnis (23%) and one-third of Kurds (33%) agree. Among Sunnis, the top choice for leading the struggle against Daesh is Kurdish forces (37%), though only 7% of Shia Iraqis agree. There are similar divides when it comes to the Popular Mobilization Units (Sunni: 3% vs. Shia: 25%) and local tribal leadership (Sunni: 26% vs. Shia: 13%).

Table 42: Best Resolution for Conflict in Iraq				
What is the best way to ultimately resolve the conflict that is taking place in Iraq?				
	ALL IRAQIS	SUNNI	SHIA	KURDS
Forming a more inclusive, representative government	60	79	53	58
Greater use of military force to defeat Daesh	25	5	31	26
Partition of the country	16	16	16	16
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>				

Overall, six in 10 Iraqis say the best way to resolve the conflict in their country is the formation of a more inclusive, representative government. Sunni respondents are even more likely to select this as the ultimate resolution (79% vs. Shia: 53% vs. Kurds: 58%). One-quarter of Iraqis say the conflict would best be resolved by the greater use of military force to defeat Daesh, a view held by about one-third of Shia respondents (31%), one-quarter of Kurds (26%), and just 5% of Sunnis. Partition of the country is the least favored option, with just 16% of respondents saying it is the best way to resolve Iraq's conflict; support for this option is identical among all three subgroups.

Table 43: Iraqi Government in Next Five Years				
How confident are you that in the next 5 years Iraqis will be able to form a government that is accepted by all segments of Iraqi society?				
	ALL IRAQIS	SUNNI	SHIA	KURDS
Confident	29	15	33	31
Not confident	71	85	67	70
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Confident is the aggregation of the responses "very confident" and "somewhat confident." Not confident is the aggregation of the responses "not so confident" and "not confident at all."</i>				

Overall, 29% of Iraqis have confidence that they will be able to form a government that is accepted by all segments of Iraqi society in the next five years, while 71% do not have confidence in this possibility. Shia (33%) and Kurdish (31%) respondents are twice as likely to be optimistic as their Sunni counterparts (15%).

All groups of Iraqis agree that the way to end conflict is forming a more inclusive, representative government.

VII. IRAN (INTERNAL)

Table 44: Iranian Support for Nuclear Agreement

How supportive are you of the nuclear agreement concluded between your country and the P5+1?	
	IRAN
Supportive	80
Not supportive	20
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Supportive is the aggregation of the responses “very supportive” and “somewhat supportive.” Not supportive is the aggregation of the responses “not so supportive” and “not supportive at all.”</i>	

Eight in 10 Iranian respondents are supportive of the nuclear agreement concluded between Iran and the P5+1, with one-third saying they are “very supportive,” while 20% are not supportive of the agreement.

Table 45: Iranian Interests and the Nuclear Agreement

In your opinion, were your country’s interests served by this agreement?	
	IRAN
Agree	81
Disagree	20
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Agree is the aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is the aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”</i>	

And when asked if they think Iran’s interests were served by the agreement, responses mirror the levels of support noted above, with eight in 10 agreeing that their country’s interests were served.

Table 46: Opinion on Iran’s Accepting Limits on Nuclear Program

Was it a good or bad idea for your government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program?	
	IRAN
A good idea	32
A bad idea	68

Despite their support of the agreement and their belief that their country's interests were served by the agreement (noted above), Iranians are still twice as likely to say that their government's acceptance of limits on its nuclear program was a bad idea (68%) rather than a good idea (32%).

Table 47: Priorities for Iranian Government

Now that some of the international sanctions imposed against your country will be lifted, how much of a priority should each of the following be for your government? Answer from 1 to 5 (with 1 being a "most important priority" to 5 "not a priority").			
RANK			IRAN
1	Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Priority	81
		Not a priority	4
2	Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Priority	75
		Not a priority	6
3	Improving relations with Arab governments	Priority	60
		Not a priority	14
4	Improving relations with the United States and the West	Priority	59
		Not a priority	16
5	Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Priority	48
		Not a priority	23

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of "3" are not included. Priority is the aggregation of the responses of 1 and 2. Not a priority is the aggregation of the responses of 4 and 5. The priorities are listed in rank order based on the percentages of 1 and 2 responses.

More than eight in 10 respondents identify "investing in improving the economy and creating employment" as an important priority for their government.



Iranian respondents were asked to rate a series of government policies on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “a most important priority” and 5 is “not a priority.” A clear picture of the Iranian people’s priorities for their government emerges from their responses. More than eight in 10 respondents identify “investing in improving the economy and creating employment” as an important priority, while just 4% say it should not be a priority for their government. Three-quarters of Iranians say “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights” is an important priority, while just 6% say it is not. General foreign policy priorities are ranked third and fourth: “improving relations with Arab governments” (60%) and “improving relations with the United States and the West” (59%). And, finally, 48% of Iranian respondents say “giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen” should be a government priority.

Table 48: Opinion on Iran’s Having Nuclear Weapons		
Which best reflects your opinion on your country having nuclear weapons?		
	2014	2015
My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation.	49	20
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also.	38	49
Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them.	14	32
<i>Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>		

In our most recent polling, one-third of Iranian respondents say that nuclear weapons are wrong and no country should have them (32%). The remaining two-thirds are divided between those who say that Iran should have nuclear weapons either because other countries do (49%) or because it is a major nation (20%).

There has been a shift in these opinions since 2014’s polling on the same issue, when less than half the number of respondents said “nuclear weapons are wrong” (14%) and more than twice as many respondents noted Iran’s being a major nation as the justification for having nuclear weapons (49% in 2014 vs. 20% in 2015).

Iranians are conflicted:
support P5+1 but still want
nuclear weapons

There has been a shift in Iranians' opinions of their country having nuclear weapons since 2014.




Table 49: Better Off/Worse Off

Do you feel that you will be better off or worse off in the next 3 years, or do you feel that your situation will be about the same?			
	2013	2014	2015
Better off	43	41	46
Worse off	27	23	21
About the same	22	30	33

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

According to the current survey, almost half of Iranians (46%) believe that their situation will be better in the next three years as a result of this agreement, more than twice as many who say they will be worse off (21%). The remaining one-third say their situation will be about the same (33%).

These numbers are quite similar to those from 2013 and 2014, though they may reflect a slight trend of growing optimism among Iranians, with an uptick in those saying they expect to be better off in the next three years and a decrease in those who say they will be worse off.

Table 50: Iran-U.S. Relations

Do you feel that in the next three years your country's relations with the United States will...?	
	IRAN
Significantly improve	32
Slightly improve	32
Worsen	13
Stay the same	24

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Almost two-thirds of Iranian respondents feel that Iran's relations with the United States will improve in the next three years because of the agreement (significantly improve: 32% and slightly improve: 32%). One-quarter say that Iranian-U.S. relations will stay the same. Just 13% feel the relationship will worsen because of this agreement.

Table 51: Iran's Role in the Region

Which best reflects your view of your country's future role in the region?	
	IRAN
My country should be the dominant player in the Gulf region.	19
My country should develop peaceful relations based on equality with other countries in the Gulf region.	37
My country should not be involved in the Gulf region. It should focus on internal matters: building our economy and our society.	44


When asked about their view of Iran's future role in the region, a plurality of respondents (44%) say they hold the view that Iran should not be involved in the Gulf region, but rather should focus on internal matters including building their economy and society. This opinion is closely followed by the view (37%) that Iran should develop peaceful relations based on equality with its Gulf region neighbors. Fewer than one in five respondents (19%) hold the view that Iran should be the dominant player in the Gulf region.

Table 52: Iran's Regional Involvement

How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries?				
RANK			2014	2015
1	Syria	Important	90	73
		Not important	7	28
2	Lebanon	Important	82	72
		Not important	16	28
3	Iraq	Important	88	64
		Not important	10	36
4	Bahrain	Important	87	57
		Not important	10	44
5	Yemen	Important	62	43
		Not important	38	57
6	Afghanistan	Important	N/A	38
		Not important	N/A	62

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Important is the aggregation of the responses "very important" and "somewhat important." Not important is the aggregation of the responses "not so important" and "not important at all." Rank order is by percentage of respondents in 2015 who rated the involvement important.

The only alteration in rank between 2014 and 2015 is the increased importance of government involvement in Lebanon.



In both 2014 and 2015, Iranians were asked to rate the importance of their government's continued involvement in six countries. In the most recent polling, the top two selections are Syria (73%) and Lebanon (72%), followed by Iraq (64%) and Bahrain (57%). Less than one-half of Iranians say that it is important for their government to continue its involvement in Yemen (43%) and Afghanistan (38%).

While the percentages of respondents saying these involvements are important were higher across the board in 2014 than in 2015, the only alteration in rank between the two years is the increased importance of Lebanon, which rose from the fourth most important behind Iraq and Bahrain in 2014 to second in 2015.

METHODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Demographics

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA *	UAE *	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	50	50	50	55	67	50	50	51
Female	50	50	50	45	33	50	50	49
Under 30	35	45	39	40	37	45	32	38
Over 30	65	55	61	60	63	55	68	62
Sunni	27	91	89	88	85	33	85	5
Shia	28	2	1	12	10	67	15	95
Christian	39	2	10	0	5	-	-	-
Druze	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Live in city	89	79	65	83	86	66	76	76
Live outside city	11	21	35	17	14	34	24	24

** The samples in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not evenly divided between male and female subjects because of the disproportionate number of males in these populations with the inclusion of residents (who are predominantly male) in addition to citizens.*

Geographic Coverage

Country	Coverage
Lebanon	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Zarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Egypt	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
KSA	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Iraq	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
Iran	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz

Sample Sizes, Dates of Survey, Margins of Error

Country	Sample Size	Dates of Survey	MOE
Lebanon	823	September 4–22, 2015	±3.5
Jordan	822	September 4–22, 2015	±3.5
Egypt	1,030	September 3–18, 2015	±3.1
KSA	1,035	September 3–22, 2015	±3.1
UAE	832	September 4–22, 2015	±3.5
Iraq	1,033	September 4–23, 2015	±3.1
Turkey	1,037	September 3–23, 2015	±3.1
Iran	1,027	September 4–20, 2015	±3.1

Sampling Methodology

In each country, the selected study centers were stratified depending on the predominant social class/income levels of the people residing in various areas (and in case of Beirut, the religious clusters). This is because in most cities/towns, people of a specific social class/income segment/religious grouping tend to stay in clusters. These strata were further sub-divided into blocks of roughly equal size, based on available data about population. Thereafter, blocks were selected at random depending on the sample size for that center and keeping in mind the social class/religious cluster distribution. A pre-assigned number of starting points were used for each selected block and sampling within the blocks was undertaken using right hand rule method. Within each selected household that agreed to participate, we took an inventory of all family members over 18 years of age and randomly selected one adult to be interviewed in a way that ensured that both genders had an equal chance of inclusion, with no one allowed to self-select into the sample.



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