Rrlll'll'lthlt· l'llt'l'!/.1' a11tl alfl'l'llaril·r .wtll't'l',\' /(,,. r·om't'l'!/t'lln' t1? a major role in the Europeunii".ation of domestic RES policies (that is ·green Europeanization' of energy policy). 4. Europeanization through diffusion? Renewable energy policies and alternative sources for European convergence Per-Oiof Busch and Helge Jorgens 4.1 INTRODUCTION In recent decades, cross-national policy clustering has become a distinctive feature of international and European environmental policy-making. Since the late 1960s, virtually every country in the world has created government institutions for the protection of the environment and adopted basic legislation in the areas of air pollution control, nature or water protection (Busch and Jorgens, 2005). This trend is even more pronounced in the group of European Union (EU) member states. Here, over the last 30 years, an impressive convergence of domestic patterns of environmental policy-making can be observed (Holzinger et al., 2008). Can a similar degree of policy clustering also be observed with regard to programs aimed at the promotion of renewable energy sources (RES)? And if so, what are the mechanisms that drive the EU-wide convergence of these programs? In order to provide an answer to these questions, this chapter examines the cross-national spread of support schemes for electricity generation from RES sources, namely mandatory feed-in tariffs (FIT) and green certificate systems, in the period from 1988 to 2005. This chapter explores the main driving forces as well as the barriers of a greater promotion of electricity from RES in the EU member states; it proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents three modes of international policy coordination. Section 4.3 then examines the spread of mandatory FIT and green certificate systems in the EU and links it to the three mechanisms of international policy coordination. Section 4.4 presents a discussion on the interactions in the proliferation of RES policies in the EU. Finally, Section 4.5 draws some tentative conclusions on the role of policy diffusion as a Europeanization mechanism. Overall, the chapter shows that diffusion-that is processes of voluntary imitation and learning among governments-has played 4.2 THREE MODES OF POLICY COORDINATION Cross-national policy clusters either can be the result of independent but similar national reactions to comparable problem pressures or else can result from cross-national policy coordination. From a Europeanization perspective it is the latter - that is the mutual adjustment of domestic policies triggered by political, economic or ecological interdependence - that is most relevant. In this chapter we therefore focus on the possible ways in which interdependence triggers international policy coordination and ultimately leads to the emergence of policy clusters and to policy convergence. We define policy coordination as the mutual adjustment of the interests, goals and actions of collective actors in the international system (Lindblom, 1965; Keohane, 1984). A closer look at the literature shows that mutual adjustment can occur in three different ways. From an international relations and Europeanization perspective, international policy coordination has been understood as resulting either from multilateral negotiations and supranational decision-making or from the coercive exploitation of asymmetries in military, political or economic power by hegemonic actors in the international system. In other words, scholars have focused primarily on centralized, top-down, hierarchical modes of international policy coordination, while decentralized and non-coercive processes of cross-national policy change have largely been ignored as independent sources of global political order (see JOrgens, 2004). This conceptual void has been filled by scholars of domestic and comparative politics who have increasingly pointed out processes of cross-national imitution and learning- often termed 'policy diffusion'- as a third and independent mechanism of international policy coordination (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Busch and Jorgens, 2007). Bringing together these two perspectives, we can distinguish three broud classes of mechanisms through which governments coordinate their policies: (1) cooperation, (2) coercion and (3) diffusion. They differ on a number of dimensions, including their basic mode of operation, the principal motivutions ofpolicymakers to consider adopting foreign policy models, the importance of reciprocity in the decision-making process, and national policymakers' leewuy to influence the design and content of an externally provided policy or to reject it altogether. Since this chapter is mostly interested in the international sources of policy clusters, our typology does not include a fourth class of mechanisms, namely, parallel but independent domestic responses to similar policy problems or func- Hc•llt'll'ti/Jir t'/11'1',111' alltla/trmati\'1' ＮｷｬＧｴｾ＠ tional re4uircmcnts. However, in our empirical analysis this 'null hypothesis' (Simmons and Elkins, 2004, p. 172) will always be taken into account. 4.2.1 Cooperation The term 'cooperation' describes multilateral and state-centered processes where negotiations among sovereign states and the subsequent formulation of multilateral agreements or supranationallaw are followed by domestic implementation and compliance. Thus, from a domestic policy perspective, cooperation refers to the conscious modification of internal policies by governments committed to multilateral standards which they have had a hand in drafting (Howlett 2000, p. 308). It is characterized by highly institutionalized and centralized, top-down decision-making procedures in the course of which the cooperating states consent on the international harmonization of their policies. Law-making within the EU constitutes the most prominent case of legally binding intergovernmental cooperation. Cooperative policy coordination involves various submechanisms of domestic policy change that have received wide scholarly attention in the international relations and Europeanization literature, including negotiation, harmonization, legalization and compliance. A characteristic feature of cooperation is its emphasis on reciprocity, which basically means that governments make their pursuit of a common policy goal conditional upon all other involved parties pursuing the same goal. While nations engage voluntarily in cooperative decision-making, once an agreement is reached and legalized they are more or less strongly obliged to comply with it and to implement it. Thus, at the implementation stage, cooperation involves a significant degree of sacrifice of national autonomy and sovereignty. The principal motivations for states to engage in processes of international cooperation are to address collective, often trans-boundary, problems where unilateral action is judged insufficient, or to harmonize different national regulations in order to reduce barriers to the free movement of people, capital and goods and to avoid trade distortions. Beyond seeking solutions for specific policy problems, international cooperation often aims at a general increase of global capacities to deal with pressing challenges such as environmental degradation, poverty, energy crises, or malfunctions of the international fmancial system. 4.2.2 Coercion Coercion occurs when external actors intentionally force nations to adopt policy innovations which they would not have adopted otherwise and do so by exploiting economic or political power asymmetries. As Simmons et al. (2008, pp. 10-11) put it: /tll' f'OIII't'l',l/t'llt't' The underlying logil' or coercion ... involves power usynHlll'trics thut ｳｴｲｾｬｧ＠ actors on ｴｾＱ･＠ ｷ･｡ｾ＠ .... Ｑ｜ｳ･ｮｴｵＮｬｾｹ＠ exploit to impose their preferences ＱＧｾｲ＠ polky ｣ｨ｡ｮｧｾ＠ coercion involves the !usually consc1ous! nuu11pulat1on ol 1ncent1ves by powellul actors to encourage others to implement policy change. Coercion as a mode of intergovernmental policy coordination comprises a set of causal mechanisms ranging from the forceful imposition of policies to economic and political conditionality. At a lower level of analysis, forceful or imposition encompasses further sub-mechanisms like economic ｳ｡ｮ｣ｾｩｯ＠ military intervention. Similarly, conditionality can be disaggregated mto the submechanisms of intergovernmental reinforcement by reward, by punishment or by support. In instances of coercion, the actors involved differ fundamentally in their principal motivations as well as in their opportunities to shape the content of the adopted policies. The principal motivation for actors that attempt to impose policies is to export their own fundamental values and principles. By contrast, policymakers in nations on which policies are imposed either simply shy away from superior power or cede to its demands because of the expected political or economic benefits which imposing actors offer in exchange for conformity with their demands. These incentives range from access to monetary resources- for example, development loans offered by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund - to access to important organizations or institutions - such as membership of the EU (Schimmelfennig and Schol:1., 2008). Reciprocity plays an important role in almost all forms of coercion. In conditionality, which is the coercive mechanism used most frequently in the environmental policy field, the dominant actor threatens the withdrawal of benefits or the withholding of rewards if the targeted government does not adopt the desired policy. The targeted government is, in principle, free to reject the adoption of the desired policy. However, in most cases this option remains a theoretical one, as receiving countries are highly dependent economically or politically on the dominant state. Moreover, policymakers in the .targeted nations have little or no opportunity to influence the content of the 1mposed policies. Conditionality, therefore, is a take-it-or-leave-it situation where economic and power asymmetries between the dominant and the targeted states limit the prospects of renegotiating the policy content or the terms of adoption. In sum, coercion eliminates almost any voluntary element in national decisions to adopt a policy innovation. More often than not, targeted nations cannot afford to defy and resist political or economic coercion, although the option to forgo the incentives or face the consequences of non-conformity with external demands exists at least theoretically. 70 4.2.3 Ht•flt•wah!t· 1'111'1',1/.V a/lllaltrl'flllll\•1' so/11'1'1',\' jin· 1'1111\'t'l'!/t'lll't' /:'ui'OJII'II/1 1'111'1'!/Y polil',l' Difl'usion We define diffusion as a process by which information on policy innovations is communicated in the international system and these policies are then adopted voluntarily and unilaterally by an increasing number of countries over time (Rogers, 2003; Sirnrnons et al., 2008). Diffusion thus refers to an international spread of policy innovations driven by information flows rather than by hierarchical pressure or collective decision-making within international institutions. At the micro level, diffusion processes involve mechanisms of social learning, copying, mimetic emulation, and political or economic competition. An essential feature of policy diffusion is that it occurs in the absence of formal or contractual obligation. Furthermore, diffusion is basically a decentralized and horizontal process (Levi-Faur, 2005). Unlike in the case of multilateral legal treaties and other forms of international cooperation, which are negotiated centrally between governments and subsequently implemented top-down, with diffusion decisionmaking procedures are decentralized and remain at the national level. The system-level effects of diffusion processes become manifest only through the accumulation of individual cases of imitation or learning with respect to one and the same policy item. In the absence of a centralized regulatory regime with highly visible and explicitly stated aims, international policy diffusion may thus result in a 'regulatory revolution by stealth' (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005, p. 8). Unlike coercion and cooperation, reciprocity plays no constitutive role in diffusion processes. Individual states take over the policies of other states unilaterally, unconditionally and without requiring other states to do same. Sometimes states adjust their policies to those of another country without the latter even noticing it. Due to their voluntary character, national policymakers' influence on the content of the adopted policy, as well as their autonomy to decide whether to adopt a policy, is significantly higher in processes of policy diffusion than in instances of cooperation or coercion. The individual motivations of policymakers to voluntarily emulate other countries' regulatory approaches vary greatly. First of all, policymakers may act in a rational manner by looking across borders for effective solutions to pressing domestic problems. Where domestic actors face great uncertainties about the potential outcomes of different policy choices, rational lesson-drawing becomes less feasible. In these cases, domestic policymakers may prefer to model their policies on those countries that are generally perceived as being successful. In the early stages of a diffusion process, policymakers may also be actively persuaded by other national, international and transnational actors to adopt certain rules or measures (Haas, 1992). During the later stages of diffusion processes, when a regulatory approach has already been adopted by a fair number of countries, other motivations, such as international pressures to conform, the attempt of political elites to enhance the legitimacy of their 71 actions, and/or their ､ｾＺｳｩｲ｣＠ to enhance their self-esteem within an intcrnutionul society structured by emerging normative standards of uppropriatc hchuvior, may become increasingly important (Finncmore and Sikkink, IＹｾＩＮ＠ In sum, diffusion comprises a variety of mechanisms which arc distinct from the mechanisms underlying cooperation and coercion because of theit· decentralized and largely voluntary character, as well as the high degree of autonomy they leave national policymakers to choose whether to udopt, modify or ignore a policy observed elsewhere. 4.3 PROMOTING ELECTRICITY GENERATION FROM RES IN THE EU: THE PROLIFERATION OF FEED-IN TARIFFS AND GREEN CERTIFICATES Based on the analytical framework outlined in the previous section, we now analyze the international spread of national support schemes for the gcncrution of electricity from RES sources, namely mandatory feed-in tariffs and green certil1cate systems. As we will see, this spread is most pronounced in the group of Ell member states, but in order to capture the entirety of what has recently been termed the 'transformative power' of the EU (Grabbe, 2006; Borzel und Risse, 2009) - that is, both internal and external Europeanization impacts - we extend 1 our analysis to a total of 43 OECD and central and eastern European countries. 4.3.1 Characteristics of Feed-In Tariffs and Green Certificate Systems FIT and green certificate systems (or quota obligations) are the two muin policy instruments for increasing electricity generation from RES or, in short, for renewable electricity (RES-E) production. To promote RES-E, FIT fix the price to be paid for RES-E, whereas green certificate systems or quotu obligpp. ations fix the quantity of RES-E to be generated or consumed (lEA, ＲＰｾＮ＠ 92-5). FIT oblige electricity producers, suppliers or consumers to buy RES-E that operators of RES plants feed into the grid, and to pay a fixed price for this electricity. Usually, the fixed price is set in advance for a period of sevcrul years and is paid by electricity suppliers to domestic operators of RES plants. Green certificate systems or quota obligations oblige electricity producers. suppliers or consumers to acquire a minimum quantity of green certifi<.:utes that are issued for the production, supply or consumption of a specified amount of RES-E. The minimum quantity may be defined either as a percentage of electricity production or consumption or as an amount in absolute units. Compliance is monitored and possible non-compliance sanctioned through, for example, fines or denial of access to the electricity grid. In the case of green certificates, these have to be trudablc at least in domestk trading 12 Nt•m•u·u/Jit• t'llt'I'J./.1' tllltl a/trmatil't' .wlll'l ＧｴＮｾ＠ schemes. Hence, the minimum 4uantity of certificates can be ac<.Juireu either by producing or consuming RES-E or else by buying surplus green certificates on the green certificate market. 40 4.3.2 Proliferation Patterns 35 4.3.2.1 30 Feed-in tariffs From 1989, when the first FIT for RES-E was introduced in the Netherlands, to 2005, 21 EU member states plus the non-EU countries Switzerland, Norway, Turkey and South Korea decided to promote the production of RESE with FIT (see Figure 4.1). Overall, the cross-national spread of FIT evolved at a relatively constant rate. Only in three single years did the number of annual introductions lie above the average of the entire proliferation period, namely in 1994 (Greece, Luxembourg and Spain), 1998 (Austria, Estonia and Latvia) and 2005 (Ireland, Slovakia and Turkey). 4.3.2.2 'I> l'tlllntrit•.., huropcun ｉＧｕｾｯｮｵｬｩｴｈ＠ • ,,r ｩｮｴｲｬｵＺＧｭｾ＠ ln•qm·m·y 111' ｩｵｴｮｈｉｕｲＬｾ＠ 7.1 1 '"" \'1'1'!/t'/11 't' -·---------------·---- ｬＧｏ｜ｉｮｴｲｵＮﾷｾ＠ frcqucm.:y - ( 'umulutivc numhcr of introdul'tions --- Annual avcra!!c of iutrodul'tion:-. ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' r - : - : - - - - : - : - - - : c - : - · - - - -··-. ·-·· • Europl·an Court of .lustil'l' dl.'l'ilks Ihut German fixed feed-in turitT ､ｯｾＮﾷ＠ not contlict with Huwpcun Union luw • Adoption of the Eumpcun Dirl'l'tivl' 011 the Promotion of lilcctricity Produced Soun..ﾷｾＮＺＭ＠ from Renewable ｅｮ｣ｲｾｹ＠ --- 25 20 15 ｉｯＭＱＧ］ＫｾＺｴＮ • Rejection of a European fixed feed-in tariff in the European Parliament • Directive Proposal of the European Commission for a European Green Certificate System • Legal action against the German fixed feed-in tariff at the European Court of Justice • Creation of Renewable Energy Certificate System Green certificate systems In 1998 the first green certificate system was introduced in the Netherlands, alongside the already existing Dutch FIT. By 2005 green certificate systems existed in 11 countries -nine European and two non-European OECD coun45 D ( ｬｾ＠ .11 lf' OECD countries - frequency of introductions ｾＺ［］Ｎ＠ European transformation countries - frequency I of introductions • European Court of Justice decides that German fixed feed-in tariff does not - Cumulative number of introductions ••• Annual average of introductions conflict with European Union law 1998 Source: 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 ＲＰｾ＠ Own data. Figure 4.2 Cross-national proliferation of green certificate systems 0 11\11 40 35 tＡ｟ＭＧＺ］ｾ＠ • Adoption of theofEuropean on ElectricityDirective Produced the Promotion from Renewable Energy Sources 30 +------1 • Rejection of a European fixed feed-in tariff in the European Parliament • Directive Proposal of the European Commission 25 +------j for a European Green Certificate System • Legal action against the German fixed feed-in tariff at the European Court of Justice ＲＰｲＭｾｌﾷｃ･｡ｵｯｮｦｒｷ｢ｬｅｧｹｴｩ｣ｓｳｭ］＠ 4.3.2.3 15 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 I 2002 2003 2004 2005 Source: tries (see Figure 4.2). Like the proliferation of FIT, the proliferation of green certificate systems evolved without noticeable accelerations. In four years green certificate systems were introduced in only one country each year (in 1998 in the Netherlands, in 2001 in Poland, in 2003 in Sweden and in 2004 in Romania). In two years they were adopted in two countries, namely Denmark and Italy, in 1999, and in Australia and Austria in 2000. Only once, in 2002, were three green certificate systems introduced within a single year (in Belgium, Japan and the United Kingdom). Own data. Figure 4.1 Cro!is-national ｰｲｯｬｾｦＧ･｡ｴｩｮ＠ ojfeed-in ｴ｡ｲｾｪﾷ＠ Interactions of the proliferation of FIT and green certificate systems A closer look at the data reveals that the proliferation of FIT and of green certificate systems did not occur independently of each other, but that the two processes were strongly interdependent. While from 1989 to 1998 FIT were the preferred instrument to promote the generation of electricity from RES, this changed considerably afterwards. Between 1999 and 2003, FIT were abolished in five European countries, namely, Italy ( 1999), Denmark ( 1999), Poland (200 I), Belgium (200 I) and Sweden (2003), and subsequently replaced by green certificate systems. The Spanish government also considered replacing the FIT with a green certificate system, but eventually refrained from doing so. 74 Ht'/11'\\'llhlt· t'llt'l'!/1' As a result, the proliferation of FIT slowed down after 199H (from one adoption every 0.7 years between I 989 and I 998 to one adoption every 1.4 years between I 999 and 2005), while the proliferation of green certificate systems started in that very year. The net increase in the number of countries in which FIT were implemented amounted to only five between 1999 and 2005. At the same time, the number of green certificate systems in European countries increased by eight between 1999 and 2005. In the next subsection we identify the driving forces of the spread of FIT and, since 1999, of green certificate systems in the EU and beyond. In particular, we explore whether and to what extent processes of policy diffusion mattered in the proliferation of these instruments. By systematically comparing the proliferation of FIT and green certificate systems we show how the two proliferation processes interacted and explain the slowdown in the proliferation of FIT and the parallel rise of quota systems. 4.3.3 Driving Forces in the International Proliferation of RES-E Policies A number of observations suggest that diffusion mattered significantly in the international proliferation of FIT and green certificate systems, whereas cooperation and coercion played no role. In many cases governments explicitly referred to similar policies implemented elsewhere when introducing either a FIT or a system of green certificates. In some cases, national governments went as far as to commission empirical studies that compared the application, successes and challenges of FIT and green certificate systems in different countries. On this basis, they were able to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two instruments before deciding which one to opt for in their country. 4.3.3.1 Feed-in tariffs: models and direct policy transfer Above all, the German regulations on FIT evolved into a widely recognized and imitated model for the introduction of FIT in many European countries and beyond (Bechberger et al., 2003, pp. 7-8). For example, the German laws strongly influenced the adoption and the design of FIT in the Czech Republic. By distributing a translation of the German laws to members of the Czech parliament and government, the Czech renewable energy association set off the public debate about an appropriate instrument for the promotion of RESE. The debate eventually culminated in the adoption of the Czech FIT in 2001 (personal communication by Martin Bursik, former Czech environmental minister, 6 March 2002), which features major similarities with the German FIT. Likewise, Greece (Ministry of Development, 2004, p. 2), Spain (Bechberger et al., 2003) and Switzerland (Eco-news, 2003) used the German laws as a blueprint for their FIT. In Austria national decision-makers repeat- amlaltrmat/1•r .wurr·r.\' ,/i1r t'll/1\'1'1'!/1'111'1' cdly brought the Ucnnun model into the public dehutc on the introduction of a FIT and demanded that the German example be followed (Nationalrut der Republik Osterreich, I996 ). Interestingly also, the German government referred explicitly to foreign experience when it first adopted its FIT in 199 I (Deutscher Bundestag. I9HH, p. 35). Again in I 998, when the first regulation on FIT was amended, the German government legitimized and justified its decision with the successful increase of RES-E production in foreign countries where FIT were operuting (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998, p. 8). In two cases, governments commissioned studies that systematically compared foreign experience with instruments for the promotion of RES-E before deciding to adopt FIT. In France, Lionel Jospin, the former French prime minister, asked Yves Cochet, a member of the French parliament, to prmluco u study evaluating foreign policies for the promotion of RES-E. The study wus tu compile the necessary information about foreign experience and identify 11 policy that could be transferred to France (Cochet, 2000, p. 36). It recommended a FIT that was a synthesis of the policies of several EU member states (ibid. pp. 20-3). The recommendation was based on the successes of several Europeun countries in boosting the use of RES sources FIT. Green certificate systems, by contrast, were seen much less enthusiastically, and the report pointed out the difficulties in their implementation and concluded that they were less effective FIT in achieving ambitious goals (ibid., pp. 40-3). The adoption of a FIT in Austria is another case in point. Much as in the French case, the Austrian FIT was based on a commissioned study that analyzed and compared existing FIT in all EU member states, Norway and Switzerland (Cerveny and Resch, 1998). Green certificate systems: failed cooperation and mediated diffusion powered by the European Commission As in the case of FIT, coercion was absent in the proliferation of green certificate systems. A closer look at the individual domestic adoptions of green certificate systems suggests that again diffusion processes mattered in their international spread. However, while decentralized and bilateral processes of imitation and learning drove the spread of FIT, the spread of green certificate systems was characterized by a more centralized approach, with the Europeun Commission actually trying to harmonize national RES policies. In October 1998 the European Commission presented a draft directive that called for u harmonization of RES policies by introducing a Europe-wide green certi ficuto system and by establishing a European market for the trade of rencwuble certificates (Hinsch, 1999). The European Commission justified its proposul with fears that different policy instruments or differences in the level of promotion could create barriers to trade within the liberalized European electricity market and cause unfair competition (European Commission. l99Hh, 4.3.3.2 76 1\w'oflt'll/1 t'llt'l'!/.1' policy pp. 3-5). Ultimately, this attempt to harmonize member states' policies failed us the German government strictly opposed the Commission draft Directive and other EU member states that had already implemented an FIT were at least reluctant to switch to a system of tradable certificates (Lauber, 2005). After lengthy negotiations a Council Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from RES (2001177/EC) was adopted in September 2001. However, instead of choosing between FIT and green certificate systems, the directive postponed harmonization to 2012, leaving it to the member states to decide which instrument to opt for. Still, the directive included criteria for assessing RES instruments that were generally biased in favor of green certificate systems. On the basis of these criteria, the different national policies for the promotion of RES policies should be evaluated in 2005 and a model for the EU-wide harmonization of national RES-E policies should eventually be selected. Hence, while the ultimate decision on harmonization was postponed, the European Commission was successful in including assessment criteria that were likely to favor green certificate systems. Two other observations underscore the favorable attitude of the European Commission toward green certificate systems. First, the majority of RES research projects funded by the European Commission examined the economic and trade implications of a green certificate system, sought to derive policy recommendations on how a European green certificate system should ideally be designed and were aimed at facilitating the exchange of experiences among national policymakers and practitioners. Second, the European Commission granted financial and logistical support to the Danish government during the drafting of its green certificate system (Lauber, 2001, p. 11). Thus, although attempts to legally harmonize national RES policies failed, the ideas promoted by the European Commission found their way into the political and scholarly debate and created favorable conditions for the gradual diffusion of green certificate systems. As harmonization failed, the mechanism by which green certificate systems spread among European countries switched from cooperation to 'mediated' diffusion, that is, diffusion powered by the information-based promotion of this policy model. The European Commission was however not the only actor that promoted green certificate systems at the international level. When the European Commission declared its intent to harmonize member states' RES policies, the Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS) was founded. This international organization gathers representatives of national governments and companies from twenty countries (including all member states of the EU) and supports the implementation of green certificate systems in Europe and beyond. RECS has set itself the goal of coordinating existing or future national green certificate systems and establishing an international market for the trade of renewable certificates without waiting for a harmonization by the European Hc•m•wo/Jir l'llri'!/Y om/allrmalli•r .mun·r.l' ,/or t'lllll't'l'!/l'lll't' 77 Commission (Bliem, 200 I, pp. lJl)-1 00). Further underscoring its fuvoruhlc attitude toward green certificute systems, the Europeun Commission grunted financial support to the RECS, in particular for a two-year test of un international RES-E certificate trade from the 200 I until 2002. The international promotion of green certificate systems evidently muttered in national RES decision-making. In an overall assessment Laubcr concludes: Parallel to the discussions of RECSs [renewable energy certificate systems! in the preparation of the EU directive, several States prepared such systems at the domes· tic level, on the assumption that this was the best market approach and with the expectation that a European market for RECs would develop in near future, (Lauber, 2001, p. 8) For example, the study that informed the British government prior to its decision to introduce green certificate systems explicitly discussed related politicul developments at the European level and their implications for the British polk:y choice: The extent to which the EU is able to promote their policies within Member Stutcs is crucial. From the publication of the White Paper in 1997 to the current dcbutcs over the merits of a Directive on Fair Access for Renew abies to the Electricity Grid, a fundamental shift has occurred within the European renewable energy policy world ... As the timetable of the Single Market (SEM) moves closer, it has become clear that renewable energy policy is expected to be complementary to the principle of a SEM ... Thus, while the White Paper concentrated on targets and how to get there, the Draft Directives have been explicit in their support for competition as the basis of promoting renewables and of the need for individual Member State renewable energy policies to meet the EU Competition and State Aid requirements. [R]enewables within the European Commission policy, as with renewables in the United Kingdom, are expected to fit with the move towards a competitive single market. (Mitchell and Anderson, 2000, pp. 25-6) The authors of the study identified the publications in which the Europeun Commission defined its position in favor of green certificate systems us 'key driver' for the renewable policy choices in the United Kingdom and other EU Member States (Mitchell and Anderson, 2000, p. 26). Similarly, the Dutch government's choice of a green certificate system wus influenced by a study that explicitly recommended taking into account the active promotion of that instrument by the European Commission. This recommendation was based on the assumption that by adopting a green certificate system the Netherlands could move ahead of likely European developments and thereby actively shape these processes: An internal EU energy market will generate demand for trade in rencwahle energy. The experience currently being gained with the trade in green labels and ultimately perhaps also with renewable certificates will give the Netherlands u head stt1rt within the EU. (vun Beck and Benncr. llJlJH, p. HH) 7X 1\11/'llflt'l/11 t'/11'1'!/.V fW/i!'y The Danish actors in the RES sector anticipated the European developments, too. They expected that the ongoing liberalization of the internal European electricity market in the mid-term future would further reinforce the European trend in favor of green certificate systems (Ruby, 2001). Consequently, Denmark introduced a green certificate system 'in order to influence the operational rules of the model that it believed would be the future choice for the EU' (Meyer, 2003, p. 604). Compared with these strong indications of mediated diffusion, direct policy transfer was less apparent during the international proliferation of green certificate systems. Nevertheless, in a few countries governments also drew on systematic comparisons of policies implemented elsewhere. The aforementioned study commissioned by the Dutch government examined and compared RES-E policies across 18 mostly European countries (van Beek and Benner, 1998). In their conclusions the authors recommended the introduction of a green certificate system, even though they also pointed out the merits and successes of feed-in tariffs (van Beek and Benner, 1998, p. 89). Similarly, the British and Australian governments sought to learn from foreign experiences in their decision-making processes by commissioning studies that explored the promises and limitations of different RES instruments (Mitchell and Anderson, 2000; Parliament of Australia, 2000). 4.4 DISCUSSION: INTERACTIONS IN THE PROLIFERATION OF RES-E POLICIES Overall, our observations support the interpretation that diffusion mattered in the international proliferation of FIT and green certificate systems. By highlighting the European Commission's attempt to adopt a binding requirement for member states to introduce green certificate systems as well as the active promotion of this instrument by various international organizations since 1998, our study also offers a plausible explanation for the slowdown in the international proliferation of FIT in European countries and their replacement by green certificate systems in some European countries. Overall, we have shown these distinct proliferation patterns to result from the operation of three mechanisms of international policy coordination: direct diffusion in the case of FIT and failed cooperation followed by internationally mediated diffusion in the case of green certificate systems. But how did these mechanisms interact with each other? A closer look at the efforts of the European Commission as well as other international organizations to promote green certificate systems allows for additional insights into the interaction of direct and mediated diffusion and (unsuccessful) cooperation. Ht'llt'I\'11/Jir t'/11'1'!/ \' 1111tl ultrmatil'l' .W/11'1 ·r.1)i w '., 1/11'1'1'!/1'111'1' Already in the llJIJOs, the Europeun Commission dismissed FIT us un appropriate model for harmonizing RES-E policies in Europe. In a report thut preceded its 199H draft directive, the European Commission took an unumbiguous position: '[T]he move from a fixed tariff approach towards one hased on trade and competition is at some stage inevitable' (European Commission, 1998a, p. 17). While green certificate systems were perceived to be compatible with the rules of the internal electricity market, FIT were perceived to restrict competition between energy sources and across countries, and to create barriers to the international trade of electricity (for example Europeun Commission, 1998a, pp. 15-16). Consequently, the draft directive proposed to prohibit FIT. Yet the European Commission's position did not prevail, mainly because of the resistance of German and Spanish renewable energy associu· tions, the German red-green government that had come to power in 19YH, und the opposition of the European Parliament to this proposal (Hinsch, 1999, p. 56). While not resulting in legal harmonization, the position of the Europeun Commission created political uncertainty about the future of FIT. At least until the adoption of directive 2001177 /EC in 2001, it remained uncertain whether the European Commission's position would win general support. This uncertainty about future binding legislation and the resulting fear on the part of EU member states of having chosen the 'wrong instrument' elucidates to some extent the decline in the proliferation of FIT after 1998. Other events and processes in European institutions added to this uncertainty about the future of FIT in Europe. Most importantly, in 1998 the German energy company Preussen Elektra brought an action against the German FIT at the Landgericht (district court) of Kiel, which forwarded this case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Preussen Elektrajustified its legal action by arguing that the German FIT constituted an inadmissible state subsidy that violated European competition laws and the liberalization of the European electricity market. In March 2001 the ECJ decided that the German FIT was not an inadmissible state subsidy. Nevertheless, the ECJ qualifit.ld its decision and emphasized possible implications for international trade by wuming 'that those rules were capable, at least potentially, of hindering intruCommunity trade' (ECJ 2001). Although the case was eventually rejt.lcted, between 1998 and 2001 the pending decision of the ECJ created a legal uncer· tainty that prevented EU member states from introducing FIT. If the ECJ hud come to the conclusion that the German FIT violated European competition and trade law, the then existing FIT would certainly have had to be abolished. Moreover, the European Parliament rejected the demand for introducing u European wide FIT in 1998 for the third time since 1996, thereby underscoring the dismissive attitude of major European institutions toward FIT (European Parliament, 1996; Rothe, 1998). ｬｾＧｵｭｦｴ＠ HO t'llt'I'!(Y polkv However, the international promotion of green certificate systems by the European Commission could not have had such a strong impact on EU member states without the emergence of the internal European electricity market. The adoption of the Council Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (96/92/EC) in 1996 created a new framework for national and international energy policies. As a result, regulatory competencies were increasingly shifted from domestic institutions to the European Commission and other European institutions. This shift in competencies enabled the European Commission to assume an increasingly influential role. The shift thus generally increased the potential effects that the European Commission's favorable attitude toward green certificate systems and its dismissive attitude toward FIT had on domestic decisions about the appropriate renewable electricity support policy. Against this background, it can be concluded that the mediated diffusion of the green certificate systems in combination with the liberalization of the internal European electricity market had significant side effects on the international proliferation of both instruments (that is contributing to the 'green Europeanization' of energy policy in the EU). The strong promotion of green certificate systems created, on the one hand, favorable conditions for their proliferation. On the other hand, other legal and political developments created increasing uncertainty about the future of FIT and negatively affected the spread of this earlier instrument. The emerging internal electricity market in Europe increased the influence of the positions put forward by the European Commission by introducing criteria for the assessment of RES-E policies that further favored the adoption of green certificate systems. 4.5 CONCLUSIONS From a Europeanization perspective, the most interesting findings of this case study relate to the interactions between the two parallel proliferation processes (that is as part of the 'green Europeanization' of the energy policy). First of all, it is worth noting that the EU-wide spread of FIT in the 1990s was not driven by legal harmonization - the Europeanization mechanism most prominently emphasized in the Europeanization and international relations literature - but by loosely coordinated instances of bilateral imitation and learning. This finding substantiates our claim that decentralized and voluntary mechanisms of policy coordination can have effects that are very similar to those of centralized policy-making. Second, the case study shows that supranational attempts to legally harmonize domestic policies can have the intended effect even if they ultimately fail. Again, this effect results from a largely voluntary and unilateral adapta- Ht'/11'1\'tlhlt• 1'111'1'!(\' and altf'l'mlfil'l' .w/11'1'1'.1' ./ill' ''PIII'I'I'gl'lll'l' HI lion of domestic policies to internationally communicated policy mmh.:ls und international policy discourses. Diffusion, thus, can be both an independent source of cross-national policy clustering and a significant side effect of failed cooperation. In both cases, international policy clustering und convergence occurs in the absence of successful international cooperation or coercion. It shows that especially in highly institutionalized contexts like the ELJ, policy diffusion can be a valid mechanism of international policy coon.lination. Third, and with regard to the distinction between direct and mcdiuted diffusion, our analysis suggests that if two policy innovations that pursue identical goals proliferate simultaneously then the innovation that is predominantly driven by mediated diffusion may affect and supersede the spread of the alternative policy innovation that is driven mainly by direct policy !runsfer. In the particular case of instruments for promoting RES-E. the anuly!!IN suggests that mediated diffusion is not only a strong mechanism of prolifct·ation but may also have significant side effects on the spread of other, competing instruments. Such side effects can be expected in particular if the international actor that communicates and promotes the policy innovution hus some regulatory powers in the related policy area. In such cases, nationul decision-makers may anticipate a possible harmonization by this actor und adopt the policy that is favored by that actor before harmonization actually becomes effective. Moreover, the analysis revealed that diffusion-driven proliferation processes may also be affected by the degree of compatibility between the policy and existing norms, such as competition and free trade. To sum up, based on these empirical findings, this chapter supports the view that diffusion as a distinct Europeanization mechanism should be puid more attention in future research regarding both the Europeanizution of energy policy and the RES policy in the framework of the European energy policy. In particular, scholars as well as policymakers should be more uttcntive to the way in which legal harmonization might impact upon ･ｸｩｳｴｮｾ＠ diffusion processes. NOTE I. 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While little is in fact known about the pructicul use of this technology and the system surrounding it, most of the actors huvc already taken a normative decision on its further deployment. In gencrul, the idea behind using CCS is surprisingly simple: by capturing the harmful greenhouse gases (GHG) before or during the fuel combustion process, trunsporting them to a storage site and then storing the emissions underground, either in empty natural-gas fields or in saline geological layers, the high-curbon combustion technologies of today can become part of the low-curbontechnologies and clean development options of tomorrow. While no !urge· scale CCS demonstration project has been finalized in the Ell to date, its intc· gration into national and European energy policies is already an impressive achievement in itself. This success story was driven by a few strategic considerations: in 2006, around 81 percent of European energy consumption derived from curbon· intensive fossil fuels, such as hard coal, lignite, oil or natural gus (Eurostut, 2009). Meanwhile, the EU will be asked to reduce its 1990 emissions level by 80 to 95 percent by 2050 in order to remain within a global 2 ｳｾｯＺ･ｮｵｲｩＬ＠ according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) rccom· mendations (IPCC, 2007). By comparing both figures, the chullcngc on the climate front becomes apparent. When we look at the global situution, the need for new technological solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions uppcurs even more urgent: in a business-as-usual scenario, energy sector C02 cmis· sions will rise in the range of 130 percent by 2050 compared with ＲＰｾ＠ (lEA. 2008). Additionally. the majority of new energy infrastructure investments in oc 85 European Energy Policy An Environmental Approach Edited by Francesc Morata and Israel Solorio Sandoval Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain Edward Elgar Chcltcnhum. UK • Northampton, MA. USA © Francesc Morata and Israel Solorio Sandoval 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 0 I 060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2011942554 /'\ ",..., ＡＺｾｓ＠ MIX Paper frorn responsible sources FSC" C018575 ISBN 978 0 85793 920 3 Typeset by Cambrian Typesetters, Cambcrlcy, Surrey Printed and bound by MPG Books Clroup, UK Contents List of contributors Foreword by Mischa Bechberger Preface and acknowledgements List of abbreviations vii ix xvi xviii Introduction: the re-evolution of energy policy in Europe Israel Solorio Sandoval and Francesc Morata PART I THE INTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY 2 A 'coordinated' European energy policy? The integration of EU energy and climate change policies Camilla Adelle, Duncan Russet and Marc Pallemaerts 3 Renewable energy and environmental policy integration: renewable fuel for the European energy policy? Jr;;rgen K. Knudsen 4 Europeanization through diffusion? Renewable energy policies and alternative sources for European convergence Per-Olof Busch and Helge Jorgens 5 Carbon capture and storage: the Europeanization of a technology in Europe's energy policy? Severin Fischer 6 Redrawing the 'green Europeanization' of energy policy Israel Solorio Sandoval and Esther Zapater PART 11 25 4H 97 THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY 7 A differential approach to energy policy? Explaining the prevalence of market-based energy policy instruments in central and eastern Europe 115 Michat'l /Jo/J/Jins ancl .fait• '/(1s1m I' VI X Thl· Europl'UII l'lll'r).:y polil'y towurds eastern neighhors: rt•halundnj.( priorities or changing paradigms'! A111111 llt•rmn:.-Surml!t 1s am/ Midwl Natorski 9 Exporting the good example'! European energy policy and sociulizution in south-cast Europe Am/rea Ciambra 10 Domestically driven, differentiated EU rule adoption: the case of energy sector reform in Turkey Luigi Carafa 11 Morocco, the European energy policy and the Mediterranean Solar Plan Gonzalo Escribano-Frances and Enrique San Martin Gonzdlez 12 Conclusions: bridging over environmental and energy policies Francesc Morata and Israel Solorio Sandoval Index 132 155 171 193 210 225 Contributors Adcllc, Camilla is a Senior Research Associate at the University of East Anglia, in Norwich, UK. IJcchberger, Mischa is an expert on renewable energy promotion policies. Since 2009, he has been in charge of the international relations of the Spanish Renewable Energy Association (APPA) in Barcelona, Spain. IJusch, Per-Olof is Post-Doctoral Researcher and Lecturer at the Chair of International Organisations and Public Policy in the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Potsdam, Germany. Carafa, Luigi is a PhD candidate at the universities of Toulouse, France and Cutania, Italy. Clambra, Andrea is a PhD Student at the School of International Studies, University of Trento, Italy. Dobblns, Michael is a Senior Researcher at the Chair of Comparative Public Policy and Administration at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Escribano-Frances, Gonzalo is Senior Researcher at the Real Instituto Elcuno and Senior Lecturer of Applied Economics at the Spanish Open University-UNED, Spain. Flscher, Severin is Associate Fellow at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, Germany, where he is working on topics related to EU energy and climate policy. Hcrranz-Surralles, Anna is a Juan de la Cierva Researcher (Ministry of Science and Innovation) at the lnstitut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IAEI). Spain . .Jiirgcns, Hclgc is Lecturer ut the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the Freie Universitllt Berlin and Managing Director of the Environmentul Policy Research Centre (FFU). Germany.