Term limits for public offices are tempting, especially where there’s a history of corruption. They’re simple. They require no judgment calls. And they sometimes may seem like the only answer to the self-perpetuating power of incumbency.
So it’s understandable that, after a series of scandals, some are suggesting that the solution to entrenched leadership in the state Legislature – and, in particular, to the power of “three men in a room” to control the state agenda – is to limit how long members can wield such power.
Bills to that effect are kicking around the Senate and Assembly. Some propose eight-year terms for the Assembly speaker, Senate president pro tem, and minority leaders in both chambers, and no more than eight consecutive years for the chairmanship of a single committee. Variations would allow 12 years for leaders.
These bills tap into our discomfort with the idea of any one person holding too much power, which the British historian, politician and writer Lord Acton summed up so concisely in declaring, “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Memorable as it is – and valid as history has often seemed to prove it to be – the quote misses important context.
Perhaps closer to the truth is this assessment from journalist and author Robert Caro (biographer of New York’s master planner, Robert Moses, and of President Lyndon Johnson): “Power reveals.” For every legislative rogue whose exploits make headlines, there are far more members who serve honestly.
Rather than merely give bad leaders less time to do bad deeds while putting the artificial constraint of term limits on good ones, the Legislature needs to see leadership differently – as conferring more responsibility, not more power, control and money.
That starts with getting rid of the stipends known as “lulus” that come with leadership posts, committee chairmanships, ranking member designations, and various conference posts that are mostly political plums. Ending lulus means ending the ability of the top leaders, who dole them out, to command loyalty or hold the threat of a pay cut over a member’s head.
Next, allow committees to elect their chairmen, rather than have leaders appoint them. That empowers legislators and diminishes the leaders’ ability to extend their control into the committee process.
Finally, give committees a greater role in moving bills to the floor – and the leaders less power to block them.
What’s left for the leaders? Still some power – particularly in their control over who sits on committees – and significant responsibility as their chambers’ representative in negotiations with the other house and the governor.
If they’re good and they’re honest, they will still probably stay a long time. And if they’re not, lawmakers whose positions and livelihoods are no longer so dependent on them will have less fear of giving them the boot. That’s how democracy should work.